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§0 Introduction 
Among philosophers and scientists interested in the nature of causation, one idea 
has gained a great deal of currency in recent years: that a proper understanding of the 
causal structure of any given situation can best be achieved by providing a causal model 
for that situation. Such a model will consist of appropriately chosen variables, together 
with structural equations that capture the relations of dependence among them. The key 
advantage to using these models—what, in the eyes of at least some authors, makes 
them indispensable—is that they provide tools by which to analyze, in a controlled 
and rigorous fashion, certain specialized counterfactuals in terms of which causation 
is to be defined.
1 Without the use of such models, so the story goes, a properly scien-
tific understanding of causation will remain forever elusive.
2 
I think this is all a tissue of confusions. The sense among many philosophers of 
causation that the techniques of causal modeling constitute some exciting new ad-
vance is an overreaction to something whose legitimate pretensions are modest. At 
the same time, we can learn some fascinating lessons about causation by showing 
why. 
Some  of  the  reasons  for  a  pessimistic  response  to  structural  equations  ap-
proaches leap out once you focus on two obvious questions: 
• What are variables? 
• What are the truth-conditions for structural equations? 
It’s not so difficult to give sensible answers to these questions (which makes it all the 
more surprising that the literature doesn’t contain any). But it’s disappointing: what 
emerges is that far from being indispensable, causal models merely provide a useful 
means for selectively representing aspects of an antecedently understood counterfactual 
structure.
3  
A close look at the details of standard structural equations accounts of causation 
unearths further problems. Some, though worth pointing out, are of only local inter-
est: the accounts suffer from obvious counterexamples; they fail to work as adver-
                                                 
1 For an example of a similar approach that—in my view, at least—lacks the needed controls, see 
Yablo (2004). 
2 For representative treatments of causation along these lines, see Pearl (2000), Hitchcock (2001), 
and Halpern & Pearl (2005). 
3 We’ll also see that they are all too frequently used to misrepresent such structures; see in particular 
the discussion of ‘late preemption’ in §5.4, below.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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tised when applied to some of the canonical preemption examples that have driven 
the causation literature. But a deeper problem remains, and it is quite interesting: 
typical accounts fail to incorporate a distinction between the default behavior of an 
object or system, and deviations therefrom.
4 (Very roughly: A system’s default behav-
ior is the behavior it would exhibit, if nothing acted on it. More helpful explanations 
will appear below!) This oversight is fatal; rectify it, and it becomes quite easy to pro-
duce a vastly improved structural equations account. (Perhaps better: a vastly im-
proved account that could, if one liked, be presented within a structural equations 
framework.) So while much of the discussion to follow will be relentlessly critical, 
proceeding systematically through the problems just indicated, my hope is that this 
criticism will make vivid the central place of the default/deviant distinction in our 
thinking about causation. If so, then in debunking some of the hype surrounding the 
structural equations approach to causation, we will at least have found a pointer to 
an urgent and largely overlooked question: What makes the default/deviant distinc-
tion tick? I’ll close with some tentative remarks about the larger significance of this 
topic. 
§1 What is the aim of a structural equations account? 
At various places in what follows, I’ll be exhibiting specific cases, and trying to 
show that standard structural equations accounts deliver intuitively wrong verdicts 
about the causal structure of these cases. So it will pay to offer a brief preamble con-
cerning the role of such intuitions. Now, I take it that a sensible attitude is not to treat 
firm intuitions about cases as absolutely non-negotiable “data”—not, that is, to adopt 
the kind of perspective one sees here, from Lewis: 
If one event is a redundant cause of another, then is it a cause simpliciter? Sometimes 
yes, it seems; sometimes no; and sometimes it is not clear one way or the other. 
When common sense delivers a firm and uncontroversial answer about a not-too-
far-fetched case, theory had better agree. If an analysis of causation does not deliver 
the common-sense answer, that is bad trouble. (Lewis 1986b, p. 194) 
Why not accord intuitions about cases such a high degree of respect? Because a 
sensible metaphysical position is that facts about what causes what reduce to facts 
about the complete history of physical states the world occupies, together with facts 
about the fundamental laws that govern the evolution of these states. Deny this re-
ductionist picture, and you might reasonably claim that close attention to causal in-
tuitions will lead us to the deep, important metaphysical commitments embedded in 
                                                 
4 I learned this useful terminology from Chris Hitchcock, whose own work on structural equa-
tions approaches clearly recognizes the importance of the default/deviant distinction. See also Maud-
lin (2004) for a very different approach that relies centrally on this distinction.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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our ordinary causal thought and talk. But the reductionist picture already settles such 
commitments, at least as far as causation is concerned. Accept this reductionist pic-
ture—as I do, and as most authors in the counterfactual tradition seem to, either im-
plicitly or explicitly
5—and it seems that even perfect success at “triangulating” on 
intuitions about cases will accomplish nothing more than the production of a seman-
tics for a fragment of English. Why should scientists, philosophers of science, or 
metaphysicians care about that?
6 
They shouldn’t. But it doesn’t follow that they should not care about intuitions at 
all. That would be an overreaction. Rather, they should treat intuitions about cases as 
defeasible evidence of the existence of a theoretically useful concept, worth careful 
articulation and study. This is, I think, a sensible attitude to take towards many topics 
in  science  and  philosophy. Do our  firmly held  intuitive  judgments  involving  the 
word “knowledge” track any concept of genuine interest for epistemology? Do our 
firmly held intuitive judgments involving the word “life” track any concept of genu-
ine interest to biology? And so on. It’s quite difficult to answer these questions well. 
But it seems clear that the best way to approach them is to start out with the assump-
tion that trying to produce an account that respects the given intuitions will lead to 
something worthwhile. In the present case, we should hope that our intuitions about 
what causes what in a variety of specific cases lead to the production of a causal con-
cept (or causal concepts—there needn’t be just one!) that will do some interesting 
theoretical work. I will proceed in this hopeful manner, and make some proposals in 
§7 about the structure of one such causal concept. 
The  shift  from  viewing  intuitions  as non-negotiable  data  to  viewing  them  as 
“guides” makes a difference to the dialectical role of examples. It won’t do to exhibit 
some example, point out that the going structural equations approaches get it wrong, 
and declare them refuted. Rather, rejecting them on such a basis only makes sense if 
one can produce a better account, and say why it is better, beyond its ability to more 
closely fit the intuitive data. That is the standard of argument I will try to meet in 
what follows, by showing that there are systematic and interesting reasons why the 
structural equations accounts on offer do such a poor job (as they do) of reproduc-
ing our intuitive verdicts about cases. 
                                                 
5 Even Lewis—the foregoing quote notwithstanding! 
6 Of course, this reductionist perspective about causation leaves wide open plenty of difficult and 
interesting  deep-metaphysical  questions,  notably  the  “Humean”  question  whether  facts  about  the 
fundamental laws themselves reduce to facts about the totality of physical states the world occupies. 
The point is just that no trace of this ontological dispute need carry forward into a dispute about the 
nature of causation. For more on this topic, see Hall (2004b), and Hitchcock (2003).   Structural Equations and Causation   
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§2 Some simple examples 
Before getting to the gory details, let’s start with some examples that work very 
well to give the flavor of structural equations approaches, and on which they succeed 
rather admirably (although, as we’ll see later on, for the wrong reasons!). We’ll con-
sider simple and undoubtedly familiar systems comprising interacting “neurons” (not 
the real thing, of course), that can fire if appropriately stimulated, and in firing send 
stimulatory or inhibitory signals to other neurons. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Here, for example, neuron A fires, sending a stimulatory signal to B, which fires as a 
result; B’s firing sends a stimulatory signal to C, which fires as a result. The order of 
events, unless otherwise specified, is left-to-right. The firing of a neuron is indicated 
by shading its circle red, the presence of a stimulatory “channel” between two neu-
rons by an arrow (the passage of a stimulatory signal is not explicitly represented). 
Throughout, I’ll use capital letters interchangeably to refer to neurons and to events 
of their firing. 
Of course, there is hardly any mystery about what causes what in a situation like 
that depicted in figure 1—nor in most other “neuron diagrams” (though some ex-
ceptions will appear later). And this is one of the advantages of working with such 
diagrams: they provide very clear test cases for any analysis of causation. But they 
also have an additional advantage, which is that they can help bring out what the dif-
ferences between rival accounts of causation boil down to. That advantage is not on 
display in figure 1, because it’s too simple. So consider instead figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
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Here, A and C fire simultaneously. A sends a stimulatory signal to B; but at the same 
time, C sends an inhibitory signal to B. (The line with a blob on the end indicates an 
inhibitory channel.) Consequently, B does not fire—although it would have, had C 
not fired. E therefore fires, not as a result of any signal from B, but rather as a result 
of the signal from D, which fires as a result of the signal from C. The standard ver-
dict about this case is that C is a cause of E, and A is not. Quite clearly, many real-
world situations have this simple preemptive structure.  
As is well-known, examples like figure 2 scotch the otherwise attractive idea that 
causation should be identified with counterfactual dependence: C is a cause of E iff had C 
not occurred, E would not have occurred. Since E in figure 2 does not thus depend 
on C, the account fails. But many have thought that the guiding idea behind it is cor-
rect, and we can usefully categorize various attempts to improve on the simple analy-
sis by how they handle cases like figure 2. Here are the main options: 
• Even though E does not depend on C, it does depend on D, and D on C
7; com-
bine the transitivity of causation with the claim that dependence at least suffices for 
causation, and you get the desired result that C is a cause of E. (See, most famously, 
Lewis 1973.) 
• Even though E does not depend on C, it does “minimally” depend on a set con-
taining C (namely, the set {A,C}), in the sense that had neither event in the set oc-
curred, E would not have occurred, while the same is not true of any subset. Some 
(e.g. Ramachandran 1997) try to develop a counterfactual account that exploits this 
idea. 
I won’t consider these two approaches further (but see Hall & Paul 2003 for 
some criticisms). The next, however, will occupy us for much of the rest of the pa-
per: 
• E depends on C, holding certain facts fixed—in this case, the fact that B does not 
fire (at the relevant time). Yablo (2004) and Hitchcock (2001) take this approach, the 
latter within a structural equations framework. The approach of Halpern & Pearl 
(2005) yields this test as a special case.  
Finally, towards the end of the paper I will outline a way to exploit the de-
fault/deviant distinction that may make the following approach viable: 
• There is a process (viz., sequence of events) connecting C to E that has the 
right intrinsic character to qualify C as a cause of E (whereas no such process connect-
                                                 
7 With, of course, the usual understanding that the dependence is “non-backtracking”: it’s not 
that if D had not fired, that would have been because C did not fire, hence E would have fired all the 
same. Lewis (1979) gives what has come to be viewed as the standard treatment of non-backtracking 
conditionals. I think the influence this article has had is highly unfortunate, because its approach is 
badly confused. See §4.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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ing A to E does); this can be brought out by examining the counterfactual structure of 
duplicates of this process, in suitable “test” circumstances. Hall (2004a) takes this 
approach, although as we’ll see in §7, he now thinks that there may be a way to im-
prove on that account. 
Let’s look at how a structural equations approach might handle figures 1 and 2. 
Now, we will shortly have to take up the questions about variables and structural 
equations raised above. But for the moment, we can ignore them, thanks to the 
highly sanitized nature of neuron diagrams. For example, in modeling figure 1 it is 
more or less obvious that we should choose three binary variables: 
A: has value 1 if neuron A fires (at the relevant time), 0 if it doesn’t. 
B: has value 1 if neuron B fires (at the relevant time), 0 if it doesn’t. 
C: has value 1 if neuron C fires (at the relevant time), 0 if it doesn’t. 
Note that there is nothing at all special about the numbers 0 and 1; they are mere 
labels. 
Next, it is more or less obvious how to write down structural equations that cap-
ture the relations of immediate dependence between these variables: 
C ⇐ B 
B ⇐ A 
Thus, the first of these equations says, roughly, that C will fire iff B does. Note that I 
use “⇐” instead of the customary “=” because (as fans of structural equations regu-
larly point out) the relation we mean to represent is not identity, but rather an asym-
metric relation that captures the way in which the variable on the left-hand side has 
its value immediately determined by the values for the variables on the right-hand side 
(e.g., the variable C is to be “set” to the same value as B). We’ll look more closely at 
how to understand these equations in §4; for now, we can simply note that in gen-
eral, for any variable X in any given model, the structural equations for that model 
will distinguish those other variables that X depends on (either immediately or medi-
ately) from those it doesn’t: X will depend on Y iff there is a sequence of variables 
Y, Z1, Z2, …, Zn, X such that Y appears on the right-hand side of the structural 
equation for Z1, Z1 appears on the right-hand side of the structural equation for Z2, 
…, Zn appears on the right-hand side of the structural equation for X. There is thus 
a sharp distinction between endogenous variables, which depend on other variables, 
and exogenous variables, which don’t. (E.g. in this model, A is the sole exogenous vari-
able.)
8 
                                                 
8 A small technical nicety: equations must take the most “efficient” form—we can’t, for example, 
make B here depend on C by rewriting the second equation as B ⇐ A + C – C. More exactly, we   Structural Equations and Causation   
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We  can  give  a  partial  but  vivid  representation  of  this  system  of  equa-
tions/variables by means of the following directed graph: 
 
 
 
Directed graph for figure 1 
 
The graph tells us that A is an exogenous variable (relative to the given model), that 
the equation for B has A as its sole ‘input’, and that the equation for C has B as its 
sole input; hence this graph simply abstracts from the pair of structural equations 
given above. Despite its superficial similarity to figure 1, this directed graph should 
obviously not be confused with figure 1. (For example, only figure 1 contains a depic-
tion of what actually happens.) 
Virtually every structural equations account of causation will say the same thing 
about why A, in figure 1, is a cause of C, and will say it in terms of the proffered 
causal model. Here is the idea. In the situation as it actually unfolds, the variables 
take on these values: 
A = B = C = 1 
But the model allows us to consider what would have happened, had A had the value 
0 (i.e., had A not occurred): we simply set 
A = 0 
and ‘update’ the values of B and C in accordance with the structural equations. We 
conclude: 
if A = 0, then C = 0 
It is because this conditional is true that A is counted a cause of C. 
Fine, but why doesn’t C likewise turn out to be a cause of A? Because of a fur-
ther stipulation about how to evaluate these conditionals, one that doesn’t kick in for 
the conditional just considered. Specifically, if we wish to evaluate 
If X = v, then P 
where X is some variable, v some possible value for it, and P some claim whose 
truth will be determined by the distribution of values for variables in whatever model 
we are using, then we must first distinguish those variables in the model that depend 
                                                                                                                                    
can say that a variable Y in the equation for X is irrelevant iff, for each way of specifying the values of 
the other variables in the equation, there is a value v such that the equation guarantees that X = v, 
regardless of the value of Y. What we require is that no structural equation contain any irrelevant vari-
ables. 
C  A  B   Structural Equations and Causation   
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on X from those that don’t. In evaluating the given conditional, the latter variables 
have their values held fixed at whatever they actually are; only the values of the former 
are updated in accordance with the structural equations. The total set of values that 
results then determines the truth of P, and so the truth of the conditional. Since A 
does not depend on C, we have 
if C = 0, then A = 1 
Hence C does not come out a cause of A. 
Some comments.  
First, in the more general treatment (given in Pearl & Halpern 2005, for exam-
ple), the sort of thing that can be an effect is any proposition whose truth is deter-
mined by the distribution of values for variables in the model; the sorts of things that 
can be causes are arbitrary conjunctions of claims of the form “X = v”. I’ll mostly 
ignore these extra complications, sticking to cases where what we wish to discern is 
the causal relationship, if any, between single events. Still, to get a story about such 
plain-vanilla event causation we clearly need some suitable translation of claims to 
the effect that some event occurs into, so to speak, the language of the model. Neu-
ron diagrams are easy; but as we’ll see later on, there are plenty of examples in which 
it is not so obvious how to do this translation. 
Second,  it’s  not  actually  guaranteed  that  a  conditional—even  if  of  the  right 
form—will be assigned a truth-value by this recipe. Why not? Because, for all we’ve 
said, the system of structural equations for a given model might contain loops, so that 
distinct variables X and Y depend on each other. If so, it can happen that, for a par-
ticular choice X = v, there is no way to update the values of the variables that de-
pend on X, consistent with the structural equations. This issue might matter, if we 
wished  to  use  the  structural  equations  approach  to  analyze  situations  involving 
backwards causation. We don’t.
9 So I’ll assume, henceforth, that our causal models 
behave themselves, and never feature such loops. 
Third, this account of conditionals will of course remind you of the requirement, 
standard in counterfactual analyses of causation, that the counterfactuals used in the 
analysis be given a non-backtracking reading. You might therefore suspect the need for 
a story—perhaps involving Lewis’s (1979) “miracles”—that will secure this reading. 
No such story is required. Once the structural equations are in place, the truth-
conditions for these conditionals are perfectly well-defined. Now, it is a further ques-
tion what the truth-conditions for these structural equations are, and it will probably 
                                                 
9 The problem indicated here for accommodating backwards causation is not at all peculiar to the 
structural  equations  approach,  but  affects  any  counterfactual  analysis.  See  Arntzenius  &  Maudlin 
(2005) for relevant details.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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come as no surprise that answering that question will revive the issue of “miracles” 
(see §4). 
Fourth, one might wonder whether the conditionals being analyzed just are ordi-
nary English counterfactual conditionals. Pearl (2000) seems to think so, but the 
proposal  doesn’t  really  survive  scrutiny.  The  main  reason  is  that  decent  truth-
conditions for the structural equations will, as we’ll see, need to rely on counterfactu-
als; so as an analysis, the account would be circular. In addition, the proffered truth-
conditions make explicit reference to a specified model, and nothing so far guarantees 
that a conditional that receives a truth-value relative to one model must receive the 
same truth-value relative to every other model that assigns it one. It would, of course, 
be rather embarrassing if this kind of stability of truth-values across models failed to 
obtain. We’ll return to this issue in §4. 
Finally, one might wonder what the big deal is, if the example of figure 1 is sup-
posed to showcase the virtues of the structural equations approach. Isn’t this just 
another counterfactual analysis of causation, with some pointlessly distracting talk of 
“models” and “equations”? Well, perhaps; but we can’t deliver that verdict just yet. 
To be fair—and to see what the fuss is about—we need to look at the treatment of 
figure 2. 
With the obvious choice of variables, here is the directed graph for the model we 
will use to analyze figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directed graph for figure 2 
 
And here are the structural equations: 
E ⇐ B + D – BD 
D ⇐ C 
B ⇐ A(1 – C) 
Finally, the actual values are these: 
A = C = D = E = 1 
B = 0 
E  A  B 
C  D   Structural Equations and Causation   
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Here is one natural and attractive way to use this model to show that C is a cause 
of E, and A is not (adapted from Hitchcock 2001). First, observe that the sequence 
of variables C-D-E is, in an obvious sense, a path from C to E: i.e., a sequence such 
that each variable immediately depends on its predecessor in the sequence. Given 
this choice of path (not the only possible choice, obviously), B is an off-path variable. 
Next, even though the conditional 
if C = 0, then E = 0 
is false, the following conditional is true: 
if (C = 0 & B = 0), then E = 0 
It is because this conditional is true that C counts as a cause of E. Why is it true? Be-
cause of a natural generalization of the recipe given above: We look at the variables 
mentioned in the antecedent. We hold fixed the values of all variables that depend 
on neither of them. We update the values of the remaining variables by means of the 
structural equations. So A, which depends on neither B nor C, retains its value 1; 
the value of D is updated to 0 by the second equation; the value of E is updated to 
0 by the first equation. 
More generally, suppose we wish to determine whether event C is a cause of 
event E. We construct an appropriate causal model, with a (typically binary) variable 
C for C and E for E, and the customary values of 0 and 1. Then C is a cause of E 
just in case there is a path from C to E, such that for zero or more off-path variables 
X1, …, Xn with actual values v1, …, vn, the conditional 
if (C = 0 & X1 = v1 & … & Xn = vn), then E = 0 
is true. It’s easy to check that this account not only delivers the verdict that C in fig-
ure 2 is a cause of E, but also the verdict that A is not a cause of E. Notice that if E 
depends on C outright (i.e., ‘holding fixed’ nothing), then C automatically qualifies as 
a cause of E. 
Now, before proceeding we should pause to make a certain limitation explicit, 
which is that we have not offered an account of causation so much as an account of 
causation-relative-to-a-model. Halpern and Pearl are admirably forthright on this point, 
and worth quoting in detail: 
According to our definition, the truth of every claim must be evaluated relative to a 
particular model of the world; that is, our definition allows us to claim only that C 
causes E in a (particular context in a) particular structural model. It is possible to 
construct two closely related structural models such that C causes E in one and C 
does not cause E in the other. Among other things, the modeler must decide which 
variables (events) to reason about and which to leave in the background. We view 
this as a feature of our model, not a bug. It moves the questions of actual causality 
to the right arena—debating which of two (or more) models of the world is a better   Structural Equations and Causation   
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representation of those aspects of the world that one wishes to capture and reason 
about. (Halpern & Pearl 2005, p. REF) 
It will emerge in §7 that there is something to be said for this perspective. But not 
much. And we’ll also see, along the way, that Halpern and Pearl drastically overesti-
mate its virtues. That’s already somewhat obvious: for example, an account that fails 
to tell us that, in figure 2, C is a cause of E simpliciter does not deserve to be taken 
seriously. For now, we should take it that there is simply an important bit of unfin-
ished business, which is to say what it is for a model to be appropriate for a given 
situation. Equipped with that distinction, we could say that C is a cause of E iff, for 
every appropriate model M of the situation in which C and E occur, C is a cause of 
E relative to M. Happily, for many of our examples it will be obvious what an ap-
propriate model is. 
The account just sketched displays but one of many options for using causal 
models to provide an account of causation. We can usefully contrast a second op-
tion, a simplification of the approach taken in Halpern & Pearl (2005). The first step 
is to liberalize the foregoing account, by allowing the off-path variables to take on 
non-actual values in the crucial conditional: C is a cause of E just in case there is a path 
from C to E, such that for zero or more off-path variables X1, …, Xn and (not nec-
essarily actual) values v1, …, vn, the conditional 
if (C = 0 & X1 = v1 & … & Xn = vn), then E = 0 
is true. Of course, that’s too liberal: for example, it counts A in figure 2 as a cause of 
E, and more generally counts preempted alternatives as genuine causes. So we add a 
further restrictive condition, which is that the following conditional must also be 
true: 
if (C = 1 & X1 = v1 & … & Xn = vn), then P 
where P ‘says’ that all of the variables on the chosen path from C to E have their 
actual values. The guiding idea is that C is a cause of E just in case there are some ex-
ternal contingencies that could have obtained, such that if they had, then (i) E would 
have depended on C; but (ii) the process connecting C to E would have been unaf-
fected.
10 
Now A in figure 2 no longer gets counted a cause of E. There is but one path 
from A to E. The only off-path variable that matters is C, and the only value that 
matters is C = 0. And while 
if (A = 0 & C = 0), then E = 0 
                                                 
10 Halpern and Pearl’s extra condition is strictly weaker than (ii), allowing that the C-E process 
could have been altered by these external contingencies, so long as the alterations were in a specific 
sense irrelevant.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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is true, 
if (A = 1 & C = 0), then (A = 1 & B = 0 & E = 1) 
is false.  
Notice that this second account (henceforth: the “HP-account”) is strictly more 
permissive than the first (henceforth: the “H-account”). It’s an easy exercise to show 
that if the H-account calls C a cause of E, relative to a given model M, then the HP-
account must also call C a cause of E, relative to M. To show the converse false, 
consider figure 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Here, the firings of A and C symmetrically overdetermine the firing of E. According 
to the H-account, neither A nor C is a cause of E; according to the HP-account, 
both are.
11 More examples on which the accounts differ will emerge in §5. 
So far, the enthusiasm toward structural equations approaches might seem to be 
justified. At the very least, they appear to provide a novel, interesting, and effective 
means for treating certain of the preemption cases that have ever been the bane of 
counterfactual analyses of causation. Unfortunately, I think these appearances mis-
lead. A proper assessment requires, to begin, a more careful, systematic statement of 
what causal models are. We’ll take up that topic next. 
§3 Variables 
Neuron diagrams are easy to model, in large part because it is so easy to choose 
variables for them: For each neuron, and each relevant time-interval (roughly: each 
time interval such that that neuron could, in the circumstances, do something inter-
esting in that time-interval), we introduce a variable to correspond to the state of that 
neuron during that interval. Typically, two values will suffice, one for “firing” and 
                                                 
11 I take it that neither account scores a decisive victory over the other, on this example, since it’s 
too unclear what a proper account of causation ought to say about symmetric overdetermination. One 
might even, in a pluralistic spirit, wish to accept both accounts, taking them to characterize slightly 
different but equally legitimate and useful causal concepts. 
C 
A 
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one for “not firing”. But we can easily add values, if we wish to distinguish different 
ways the neurons can fire.  
All of this suggests a more general prescription for choosing variables and values, 
for an arbitrary system we might wish to model: First, find a way to “carve up” the 
system into discrete, well-defined sub-systems. Second, for each relevant sub-system, 
and each relevant time or time-interval, introduce a variable to characterize the in-
trinsic physical state of that sub-system at that time, or during that time-interval. 
I used “relevant” twice, partly because not every sub-system needs explicit repre-
sentation (for example, one need not bother with variables corresponding to the 
stimulatory and inhibitory channels between neurons), and partly because not every 
moment of time is such that the behavior of the system at that time needs represent-
ing (for example, one also need not bother with variables that characterize the state 
of neurons before or after the events under consideration, or during the passage of 
signals).
12 
In addition, it may not always be straightforward how to “carve up” the given 
system into sub-systems. It will be fairly straightforward, if the system is constituted 
by a number of clearly distinguishable, interacting parts. But that won’t always be the 
case—at least, at the desired level of description. Consider the flow of water down 
some rapids: what choice could we make of interacting parts, given that we don’t 
wish to introduce variables for the state of each water molecule at each moment? 
Here a kind of default option suggests itself, which is that we choose variables to 
correspond to reasonably well-defined regions of space at different times, or regions 
of spacetime. The price of exercising this option is, in general, that no set of vari-
ables will stand out as uniquely appropriate.  
Patently, what I’ve offered is far very from an exact recipe for determining the 
variables and values appropriate for modeling any given situation. But that is perhaps 
as it should be: within broad but non-trivial constraints, many choices are permissi-
ble. But some fans of structural equations approaches think that I have not been 
nearly permissive enough.
13 They hold that variables should be allowed to corre-
spond to any family—any family whatsoever—of pairwise-incompatible propositions 
                                                 
12 But how can we be sure that we aren’t tacitly relying on our antecedent understanding of the causal 
structure of the given situation to decide what we should and shouldn’t “bother” with? A legitimate worry, 
particularly if structural equations accounts aim to be substantially illuminating of the nature of causa-
tion—i.e., if they aim to be reductive (as they really ought, I think). But I think the worry can be got-
ten around: it will be enough to have a guarantee that, if C causes E relative to model M, then C 
causes E relative to any model M* that is richer than M in that it introduces additional variables for 
aspects of the given situation not represented in M. It’s an embarrassment for both the H- and HP-
accounts that they fail this extendability condition; see §§5.2 and 5.3. 
13 Halpern, personal communication.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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(i.e., each distinct value of the given variable corresponds to a distinct member of the 
associated family). What I have in effect done is to restrict these families, requiring 
that each proposition in one of them be about the state of a particular physical sys-
tem or region of space at or during a particular time or time-interval. Why not relax 
this restriction? 
Emphatically not because doing so will lead to a view according to which it is 
facts, and not events, that are the causal relata. I find nothing at all attractive about 
the widespread view
14 that facts (by which let’s just mean: true propositions) are too 
abstract or non-natural or inert or whatever to be causes or effects. The worry is 
more theoretically driven, and has two parts: First, without some constraints on vari-
ables like those I have suggested, structural equations approaches will fail for silly 
reasons. Second, no clear advantages accrue to relaxing the suggested restrictions. So 
we should stick with them. 
The case for the second reason—that there is no pressing reason to allow vari-
ables to correspond to arbitrary sets of propositions—will play out over the rest of 
the paper. But the trouble with allowing such arbitrary correspondence is easy to see, 
and comes in two forms. Consider figure 4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Here, two processes unfold concurrently. At time zero, A and D fire; a short while 
later B and E fire; then C and F fire. The two processes are completely causally iso-
lated from each other. The natural causal model—the one that respected the con-
straints on variables I’ve suggested imposing—would of course reflect this fact. Here 
is a slightly unnatural causal model: 
B: has value 1 if neuron B fires (at the relevant time), 0 if it doesn’t. 
C, D, E, F: defined similarly. 
X: has value 1 if either both or neither of A and D fire; 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
14 Not widespread among the causal modeling folk, to be sure; here I applaud their sensibility. 
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You can see where this is going, but we might as well let the gory details play them-
selves out. Accordingly, here are the equations: 
C ⇐ B 
F ⇐ E 
E ⇐ D 
B ⇐ 2XD – X – D + 1 
And here is the corresponding directed graph: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directed graph for figure 4 
 
All variables have value 1. Focus on the path D-B-C. Then 
if (D = 0 & X = 1), then C = 0 
is true. So both the H-account and the HP-account classify D as a cause of C. 
This result is plainly silly, and doesn’t look any less silly if you insist that causal 
claims must always be relativized to a model. Figure 4 shows that this claim is just 
false. While there are, as we will see, some cases where, arguably, judgments about 
what causes what can be influenced by the decisions one makes about how to con-
ceptualize the situation—decisions that can be reflected in a choice of model—this is 
simply not one of them: there is no sense whatsoever in which D is causally impli-
cated in C. A much more honest response is to claim that the given choice of model 
is an inappropriate one, in some objective sense of “inappropriate”. Fine, but what 
makes it inappropriate? Blindingly obvious answer: the choice of variable X, which, 
once it is introduced into the model, inevitably leads both structural equations ac-
counts to conflate logical relations with causal relations.
15 
                                                 
15 Good grief; why is progress in philosophy so hard? This danger of conflating logical and causal 
relations is, after all, nothing new: it’s been well-understood in the philosophy literature for at least 35 
years, since Kim’s 1971 critique of Mackie’s account of causation. 
C  X  B 
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Such choices can lead to a different kind of trouble as well, illustrated by a differ-
ent bad causal model for figure 4. This time, we’ll choose the sensible variables for 
A, C, D, and F, but collapse the behavior of B and E into a single variable: 
Y: has value 1 if both or neither of B and E fire, 0 otherwise. 
Now the problem is not that we get the wrong verdicts about what causes what, but 
that we don’t know how to set up the causal model in the first place. For, while one 
of the equations is easy: 
Y ⇐ 2AD – A – D + 1  
the remaining equations—for C and for F—are not. We might try the obvious 
C ⇐ A 
F ⇐ D 
But  these  equations  render Y  entirely  irrelevant to  C  and  F—which  seems  quite 
wrong, as Y concerns states of affairs not only temporally but causally intermediate 
between the events A and D, on the one hand, and the events C and F, on the other. 
What’s more, the irrelevance of one variable for another ought to emerge as the result 
of applying some principled recipe for writing down structural equations, and then 
seeing that the equation renders the variable irrelevant.  
So let’s try to write down an equation for C, say, in terms of A, D, and Y—
bearing in mind that the resulting equation might reveal one or more of these vari-
ables to be irrelevant to C (in the mathematical sense: e.g., the equation will reveal D 
to be irrelevant iff for all values of A and Y, the equation fixes a value for C inde-
pendent of the value of D). The equation can simply take the form of a table: there 
are eight ways to distribute values over A, D, and Y, and for each way, we need to 
fix a value for C. Some entries will be easy: for example, if A = D = Y = 1, then 
we should have C = 1. But other entries are not so easy. Suppose A = D = 1, but 
Y = 0; intuitively, this setting represents a situation in which, despite the fact that A 
and D both fire, one and only one of B and E fires. But which one? We will some-
how have to settle that question, in order to figure out what the value of C should 
be. And there is manifestly no way to do so. So with the given choice of variables, 
we’ve destroyed our ability to construct a causal model. 
Now, with respect to this problem the fan of permissiveness in variable choice 
could easily say, “Look, all this shows is that you have to choose variables in such a 
way as to make it possible to write down unambiguous structural equations. Duh!!” 
Indeed. And one of the advantages of not being so permissive about variable choice 
(over and above the need to avoid conflating logical and causal relations) is precisely   Structural Equations and Causation   
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that it makes the task of writing down unambiguous structural equations vastly eas-
ier. We’ll see why in the next section. 
§4 Structural equations and their truth-conditions 
It’s mildly scandalous that the causal modeling literature contains so little sub-
stantive discussion of what makes for a good choice of variables. But at least in prac-
tice, it’s typically reasonably clear how to make this choice. By contrast, it is far, far 
more scandalous that the literature says so little about the truth-conditions for struc-
tural equations: scan Pearl’s (2000) book-length treatment of causal modeling, for exam-
ple, and you find nothing more substantive on this topic than scattered remarks such 
as the following: “The world consists of a huge number of autonomous and invari-
ant linkages or mechanisms, each corresponding to a physical process that constrains 
the behavior of a relatively small group of variables.” (p. 223) We are told nothing—
anywhere in the book—that might yield an adequate understanding of such concepts as 
autonomous, mechanisms, or—most crucially—constrains.
16 
This lack of attention to such a crucial detail is shocking. At least we know what 
we mean—what sort of fact we are picking out—when we attribute some value to 
some variable; the issue with variables is the comparatively tractable one of what 
sorts of rules we should follow in collecting together a set of pair-wise incompatible 
propositions under the heading of a single variable. No such clarity attends the no-
tion of a structural equation. A technical term—one of central importance in under-
standing what a causal model purports to represent—it nevertheless receives nothing 
approaching an adequate exposition. Lacking one, the notion cannot justly claim to 
provide the key to an illuminating understanding of causation. 
Now, in suitably sanitized examples, a tacit and loose counterfactual interpretation 
of structural equations will naturally suggest itself, and may lead to a more or less 
obvious way to write down the structural equations. That is exactly what happened in 
the case of figures 1 and 2, for example. But we will see other examples—cases of 
preemption only slightly more complicated than that depicted in figure 2, for in-
stance—in which such reliance on intuitive, non-explicit criteria for determining rela-
tions of dependency has led causal modelers badly astray. The need to avoid such 
mistakes provides us with a second reason to demand greater clarity. 
I suspect that part of the tolerance for a lack of clarity about the truth-conditions 
for structural equations comes from the impression that there are no adequate alter-
natives to treating the notion as a kind of primitive, and using it to analyze the coun-
terfactuals that will provide the ingredients for an account of causation. Now, to the 
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extent that one thinks of Lewis’s “miracles”-based account (in Lewis 1979) as pro-
viding the main or perhaps only alternative, this impression is entirely understand-
able. Without going into details, that account is baroque, poorly motivated, and fails 
even on its own terms.
17 But there is a much better account, which builds on a pro-
posal in Maudlin (2003). It will  work quite nicely  to provide truth-conditions for 
structural equations—provided the strictures on choice of variables discussed in the 
last section are adhered to. To see how it works, and how it can be adapted to the 
needs of causal modeling, let’s begin with a simple example. 
At noon, Suzy throws a rock at a window. A few second later, the window 
breaks. Let C be her throw, E the breaking of the window. We seek truth-conditions 
for the conditional “if C had not occurred, then P”, where P can be any claim about 
the post-C history of the world (e.g., “E does not occur”). So consider the state of 
the world—the complete, fundamental physical state of the world—at the time at 
which C occurs.
18 Consider a nomologically possible alternative to this physical state, 
which is just like it except that C does not occur. (Think of arriving at this state as 
follows: Begin with the actual state. Make localized changes to it—localized, that is, 
to the place or physical systems involved in C’s occurrence—sufficient to guarantee 
C’s non-occurrence.) The actual, fundamental physical laws proscribe a certain for-
ward evolution for this physical state. If that forward evolution is such as to make it 
the case that P, then the conditional is true; if it is such as to make it the case that 
not-P, then the conditional is false. In the given example, we begin with an alterna-
tive state that is just like the actual state, save that Suzy doesn’t throw. Forward evo-
lution: the window doesn’t break. In this way we secure the intuitively correct value 
true for “if Suzy hadn’t thrown, the window would not have broken”. 
                                                 
17 A very quick example, which I learned years ago from Jim Woodward: Suppose that event E is 
multiply overdetermined by immediately preceding events D1, …, Dn. Suppose that each of these 
events in turn is a joint effect of event C, which immediately precedes them. Such structures are trans-
parently possible, if rare. On Lewis’s account of non-backtracking counterfactuals, the “closest” world 
in which E does not occur is one that perfectly matches as much of actual history up to the time of E 
as possible, consistent with introducing a small, localized “miracle” (a violation of actual, though not 
counterfactual, law) that will throw history off course just enough to make E not occur. Now, one 
such miracle could be the non-occurrence of C. We could ensure a slightly longer stretch of perfect 
match of history, but only at the cost of n miracles—i.e., the non-occurrences of each of D1 through 
Dn. Given the method that Lewis is unavoidably committed to for balancing the cost of miracles 
against the benefit of perfect match, we must choose the first option: a single earlier miracle, consisting 
in the non-occurrence of C. So, in the non-backtracking sense that Lewis takes to suffice for causation, it turns 
out that if E had not occurred, then C would not have occurred. That is a reductio. And there are 
others: see for example Elga (2001). 
18 Begins to occur, really—after all, C takes some time to occur. I’ll omit this qualification hence-
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We can also use this recipe to evaluate conditionals of the form “if C had oc-
curred in such-and-such a manner, then P”: Begin with the actual state of the world 
at the time of C’s occurrence. Make localized changes, sufficient to make C occur in 
the specified way. Evolve the resulting state forward, in accordance with the actual 
fundamental laws. Check to see whether P comes true. Shortly, this version of the 
recipe will prove useful, in given systematic truth-conditions for structural equations. 
A number of comments, before we proceed to that task. 
First, these truth-conditions for counterfactuals don’t yet take proper account of 
indeterminism,  of  either the  fundamental  stochastic  variety  or  the  statistical  me-
chanical variety.
19 We’ll ignore these issues here (fair enough, given that causal mod-
elers routinely ignore them).  
Second, it’s worth emphasizing that this account breaks sharply with philosophi-
cal tradition, in that it does not give a semantics for counterfactuals in terms of simi-
larity between possible worlds but rather in terms of similarity between possible complete 
physical states of worlds. A smart move: much of what is so baroque about Lewis’s 
account, for example, flows from his insistence on defining a similarity relation be-
tween whole worlds. Note, in addition, that not much is required here of the notion 
of “similarity”: what we need, ultimately, is just a well-defined sense in which one 
complete physical state can be exactly the same as another, except in a certain speci-
fied respect that concerns a localized region or physical system.
20 
Third, we should not think that when we modify this localized region or physical 
system so as to make some actual event C fail to occur, we try to find an alternative 
state for this patch of the world that is as similar as possible to its actual state, consis-
tent with the requirement that C not occur. That will lead to silly deliberations like 
the following: “Well, in the counterfactual situation in which Suzy’s throw does not 
occur, what happens instead? Does she perhaps toss it? But then how do we know 
that such a tossing is not numerically identical to the actual throw?” Lewis has some 
partially useful remarks on this point: 
What is the closest way to actuality for C not to occur? —It is for C to be replaced 
by a very similar event, one which is almost but not quite C, one that is just barely 
over the border that divides versions of C itself from its nearest alternatives. But if 
C is taken to be fairly fragile [i.e., characterized by stringent conditions of occur-
rence], then if C had not occurred and almost-C had occurred instead, very likely 
the effects of almost-C would have been much the same as the actual effects of C. 
                                                 
19 Nor do they take account of the relativistic prohibition on talk of states-at-times. That over-
sight, I think, is easily fixed by switching to talk of states on appropriately chosen spacelike hypersur-
faces. 
20 Quantum mechanical entanglement might raise a serious problem here. I’m going to blithely 
assume that the problem can somehow be solved. That’s okay, since if it is a problem I reckon it’s 
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So our causal counterfactual will not mean what we thought it meant, and it may 
well not have the truth value we thought it had. When asked to suppose counter-
factually that C does not occur, we don't really look for the very closest possible 
world where C's conditions of occurrence are not quite satisfied. Rather, we imag-
ine that C is completely and cleanly excised from history, leaving behind no fragment or 
approximation of itself. (Lewis 2004, p. REF; italics added) 
I  think  Lewis’s  observations  are  right on target—up  to  the  italicized  portion,  at 
which point they lapse into incoherence. What exactly does such “complete and 
clean excision” consist in? Removal of the event by some sort of metaphysical scal-
pel? Leaving behind … what? The Void? 
A much better view is that for any given event, we work with an antecedently 
understood distinction between a default state for the region in which the event oc-
curs, or for the physical system or systems to which it pertains. Conceiving of the 
event as one among various possible deviations from that default state, we answer the 
question, “What would have happened, had that event not occurred?” by returning 
the relevant region or system to its default state, holding the state of everything else 
fixed. It is in this way—and not by metaphysical surgery—that we fill in the Maudlin- 
recipe for evaluating counterfactuals. I’ll say more about the default/deviant distinc-
tion in §6; for now, observe how well it fits with the way we naturally think about the 
case of Suzy and the rock, or indeed about neuron diagrams: In the case of Suzy, 
what we naturally think is that if she had not thrown the rock, what she would have 
been doing instead is standing there idly—doing nothing, as it were. Likewise, if we ask 
what would have happened, had a given neuron-firing not occurred, we naturally fo-
cus on an alternative situation in which that neuron remains, at the time in question, 
in its dormant state—not a situation in which it fires in a different manner, let alone a 
situation in which it is wholly absent, having been extracted in the course of surgery! 
Fourth, it is not really to be hoped that—even with a default state specified—the 
recipe will yield a unique counterfactual state of the world. Here, multiple realization 
reigns, and we should correspondingly expect limits on what we can say about any 
given counterfactual situation. If Suzy’s throw hadn’t occurred, the window wouldn’t 
have broken. –Not just then, at least. Would it have remained unbroken for the next 
year? We don’t know, of course, and not because it’s too hard to find out!
21 
Fifth, the recipe is quite limited in scope. It says nothing about conditionals such 
as the following: “If gravity had obeyed an inverse-cube law, Kepler’s second law still 
would have held.” (True, by the way.) Nor is it built to handle “backwards” condi-
                                                 
21 There’s room for fussing here about the relation between “might” and “would” counterfactu-
als. We can all agree that if Suzy had not thrown, the window might have remained unbroken for the 
next year. Lewis (1973b) argues that we must therefore deny that the window would have broken in 
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tionals, in which the consequent concerns a time or times before the time or times that 
the antecedent is about.
22 Neither limitation poses a problem, given the purposes to 
which we will put the recipe; the second, in fact, is exactly what allows us to avoid 
talk of “miracles”.
23 A further limitation is even more clearly beneficial: Referring 
back to figure 4, the recipe equivocates if we ask, for example, what would have 
happened if exactly one of A and D had fired; for we don’t have a rule for deciding 
which one, and so can’t specify in enough detail the relevant counterfactual state of 
the world. For some purposes, this won’t matter: e.g., we can at least say that exactly 
one of C and F would have fired. For other purposes it will: e.g., we can’t say that C 
would have fired, or that it would not have fired. Now, I think of this last limitation 
as a feature, not a bug: it will force us to be scrupulous in our choice of variables, 
and so gives content to the idea floated in the last section, that this choice needs to 
be made in a way that will allow for clean, unambiguous structural equations linking 
these variables.  
Time to consider how to arrive at such structural equations. We’ll start with a 
simple idea, spot the need for an amendment, and refine accordingly. 
As an illustration, suppose we have some situation for which we wish to provide 
a causal model, and suppose we’ve decided that this model should make use of five 
variables: C1, C2, D1, D2, and E. Respecting the strictures laid out in §3, we have 
chosen these variables in such a  way that each has a  well-defined time or time-
interval associated with it. Let’s suppose that C1 and C2 concern the same time, as 
do D1 and D2; let’s suppose further that the temporal order among the five variables 
is this: C1, C2 < D1, D2 < E. Then a simple approach is to stipulate that the equa-
tions for D1 and D2 shall include only C1 and C2, and that the equation for E shall 
include only D1 and D2. The Maudlin-recipe applies straightforwardly. To fix an 
equation for D1, for example, we need to determine, for each setting of the C-
variables C1 = v1 and C2 = v2, a resulting value for D1. Begin with the state of the 
                                                 
22 Why not? Why not just take the alternative state, and evolve it backwards (in accordance with 
the actual fundamental laws), as well as forwards? Won’t that give us truths about how the past would 
have been, had some present event not occurred, or occurred differently? In principle, yes. But in 
practice it will, for typical cases, be virtually impossible to say in any detail how the past would have 
been—even if the fundamental laws are time-reversible. (Try some examples, if you’re not convinced.) 
Add the fact that our purposes here don’t require us to extend the Maudlin-recipe in this way, and we 
should conclude that there is no real point to doing so. 
23 What about backwards causation? It can be accommodated, if one wishes, by some refine-
ments that I won’t go into here. Observe, though, that Lewis’s “miracles” account provides—his 
claims to the contrary notwithstanding—no help in securing the possibility of backwards causation. 
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world at the time the C-variables concern. Modify it locally so as to make C1 = v1 
and C2 = v2. Evolve the resulting state forward in accordance with the actual fun-
damental laws. The value for D1 will be that unique value w such that the proposi-
tion D1 = w is guaranteed to be true, given this forward evolution.
24 
(What if there is no such unique value? Well, there won’t be more than one; the 
worry is that there might not be any. If so, that shows that there was something 
wrong with our choice of variables—e.g., they weren’t “fine-grained” enough. (We’ll 
see an example in the next section, during the discussion of late preemption.) Then 
we should simply fix the problem, and move on.) 
This account of the truth-conditions for structural equations almost works. But 
there is a problem, one that arises if we are, as it were, too parsimonious in our 
choice of variables. Consider figure 2 again. Suppose we simply omit the variables A 
and B, choosing to construct a model using only C, D, and E. Then the account just 
given will yield these structural equations: 
E ⇐ D 
D ⇐ C 
There’s no problem with the second, nor—in a certain sense—with the first; that is, 
the first correctly captures the way that E immediately depends on D. But put them 
together in a single causal model, and that model will tell us (in accordance with the 
recipe presented in §2) that the conditional 
if C = 0, then E = 0 
is true. Now, no one said that that conditional—which, remember, is essentially a 
technical device explicitly defined by reference to a causal model—had to have, rela-
tive to any model that assigns it a truth-value, the same truth-value as the conditional 
“if C = 0, then E = 0” that we evaluate using the Maudlin-recipe. The latter condi-
tional is straightforwardly false—false full stop, and not merely relative to this or that 
model. Perhaps we should rest content with the position that the former conditional 
can be true relative to some models (e.g., this one), and false relative to others (e.g., 
the more complete model of figure 2 provided in §2). 
But that would be a mistake, a move that would shift even more of the burden of 
providing an adequate structural equations account of causation onto the project of 
producing the as-yet unwritten rules for choosing “appropriate” causal models. It’s 
                                                 
24 Don’t be fooled, of course, by the heuristic talk of “modifying” and “evolving” (as if complete 
physical states were something we could manipulate). When cleansed of such talk, it’s apparent that 
what we have provided here is a purely metaphysical story about what makes a given structural equation 
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much better to lay down rules that guarantee a certain kind of stability in our causal 
models, so that a conditional like the foregoing one will receive the same truth-value 
relative to every model that assigns it one. There is a natural way to achieve this ef-
fect, one with the added benefit of guaranteeing that this truth-value will match the 
one yielded by the Maudlin-recipe. 
Return to figure 2, and our overly parsimonious model for it that used only vari-
ables C, D, and E. The trouble we got into with this model derived from the fact 
that, in the counterfactual situation in which C has the value 0, one consequence of its 
having this value is that neuron B fires, which in turn guarantees that E fires. But our 
paired-down model contains no variable whose value could reflect the fact that B 
fires. One bad solution to this problem is to insist that an acceptable model contain a 
comprehensive enough set of variables, so that any relevant consequence of one 
variable’s having a given value gets explicit representation in the values of other vari-
ables. I think that places too high a demand on the causal modeler, and at any rate 
there is a cleaner approach. To illustrate, I’ll stick to this three-variable model for 
figure 2. 
The temporal order of the variables is C < D < E. In writing down equations 
for these variables, we adopt the policy that for a given variable, any temporally prior 
variable is allowed to figure in its structural equation. Since C is the sole variable 
prior to D, we recover, using the Maudlin-recipe, the same equation for D as before: 
D ⇐ C 
But E is now allowed to functionally depend on both C and D. That means that, for 
each of the four ways of assigning values to C and D, we need to determine a result-
ing value for E. So consider the case C = x and D = y. Focus on the state of the 
world at the time that C concerns. Make local changes, sufficient to guarantee that C 
= x.  (If C = x in actuality, no changes will be necessary.) Evolve the resulting state 
forward until the time that D concerns. Make local changes to this state, sufficient to 
guarantee that D = y. (Again, no changes may be necessary.) Evolve this newly 
modified state forward in time. Some value for E will result. That is the value that 
the structural equation for E should specify as output, when given as input the val-
ues C = x, D = y. 
Let’s test this approach. For the situation depicted in figure 2, the actual values C 
= 1, D = 1 obviously map to E = 1. Given the values C = 1, D = 0, we begin 
with the (actual) state in which both C and A fire, evolve forward into a state in 
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still doesn’t), evolve this state forward, and see that E does not fire. So, for C = 1, D 
= 0, we must have E = 0. It’s routine to check the other two cases: C = 0, D = 1 
gives us E = 1; C = 0, D = 0 gives us E = 1. More simply: 
E ⇐ 1 – C + CD 
Notice, finally, that the fact that this is the correct equation for E depends crucially 
on what variables are included in the model. Reintroduce B, for example, and the 
correct equation renders C irrelevant. That result, of course, is exactly as it should 
be. 
The generalization of this recipe is straightforward: Suppose we have some vari-
able X in some model M. If we have been scrupulous in our choice of variables, 
there will be a clear-cut distinction between those other variables in M that are tem-
porally prior to X, and those that are not. For each way of assigning values to the 
former variables, we can follow the ‘sequential updating’ variant of the Maudlin-
recipe to fix a resulting value for X. In this way, the fundamental laws, together with 
the actual history of the world, will fix a unique structural equation for X (in terms of 
the other variables in M). 
Now consider some variable C in M that is temporally prior to X. Consider the 
counterfactual situation in which C = c, arrived at by locally modifying the state of 
the world at the time that C concerns so as to make C = c, and evolving this state 
forward in time. This forward evolution will yield some assignment of values to all 
variables in the model: those that are temporally prior or concurrent with C will re-
ceive their actual values; the remaining variables may receive different values. What’s 
more, given our truth-conditions for structural equations, the value that X receives 
in this counterfactual situation must be the same as the value that the structural equa-
tion for X yields, when given as input the values that all the variables prior to X re-
ceive, in this counterfactual situation. It follows that the conditional  
if C = c, then X = x, 
evaluated by the procedure described in §2, must, regardless of the details of the 
model M, receive the same truth-value as the counterfactual “if C = c, then X = x” 
(when evaluated by the Maudlin-recipe). We have thus arrived at truth-conditions for 
structural equations that are not only clear, but that also guarantee that the appar-
ently model-relative truth-conditions for conditionals laid out in §2 are in fact not model 
relative: Any model that assigns a conditional a truth-value will assign it the same 
truth-value, and moreover will assign it the truth-value it ought to have (i.e., the truth-
value determined by the Maudlin-recipe).   Structural Equations and Causation   
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(We haven’t covered the case of the more complicated conditionals used in both 
the H-account and the HP-account to define causation. No matter: it’s an easy exer-
cise to show that parallel results apply to them. What’s more, we’ll shortly see that it 
was a mistake to rely on such conditionals, in the first place.) 
One final issue needs to be addressed, that concerns a certain problem that can 
arise from a combination of incautious choice of variables together with lake of care 
in writing down structural equations. Here is the abstract form of the problem: Sup-
pose we have an equation for B in terms of A, and an equation for C in terms of B. 
Given our first equation, the following conditional is true: 
if A = x, then B = y 
Given our second, the following conditional is true: 
if B = y, then C = z 
Assuming the two equations in our three-variable model are correct, we can immedi-
ately conclude that 
if A = x, then C = z
25 
But this reasoning will be fallacious if the meaning of “B = y”, as it appears in the 
consequent of the first conditional, is not the same as the meaning of “B = y”, as it 
appears in the antecedent of the second. Granted; but you might wonder what the 
worry is. After all, how could anyone be so stupid as to equivocate in this way? 
You’d be surprised. 
The danger of equivocation becomes quite real when we introduce a binary vari-
able X to represent some event, and stipulate that “X = 0” means that the event does 
not occur. Such a claim can be quite open-ended, in a way that will cause the mod-
eler headaches, if she’s not sufficiently careful. An example will bring out the poten-
tial problems nicely: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
                                                 
25 It doesn’t follow—and better  not!—that transitivity  for these conditionals holds  in  general. 
What secures transitivity in this case is that, given the facts of the case, the correct equation for C 
renders A irrelevant. 
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The connection between A and D in figure 5 is not of the normal kind; in particular, 
whether A fires never has an effect on whether D fires (even if C does not fire). No, 
D will fire iff stimulated by C. What A does is to determine whether D fires with 
normal intensity, as in figure 5, or feebly, as in figure 6: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
Neuron E, finally, will fire iff stimulated by D; what’s more, the way in which it fires 
is completely insensitive to whether D fires feebly. 
A sensible causal model for figures 5 and 6 will, obviously, introduce binary vari-
ables for A, C, and E, and a ternary variable for D. But suppose we don’t do that; in-
stead, we introduce a binary variable for D, stipulating that D = 1 iff D fires nor-
mally, and D = 0 iff it does not fire normally—i.e., either fires feebly or not at all. 
Then we can certainly write down this correct equation for D: 
D ⇐ AC 
But we can’t write down any correct equation for E. The reason is that, in following 
the sequential updating version of the Maudlin-recipe, there will be cases in which 
we need to make local adjustments to the state of the world, at the relevant time, in 
order to guarantee that D = 0; and we simply won’t know how to make them. (Spe-
cifically, suppose we want to know what the equation for E should yield as value, for 
the inputs A = 1, C = 1, D = 0.) 
On the other hand, we could stipulate that D = 0 iff D does not fire at all (at the 
relevant time), and D = 1 iff it fires in some way or other. Then we can write down 
correct equations for both D and E: 
E ⇐ D 
D ⇐ C 
Now the problem is that we’ve lost the ability to model A’s effect on D.  
Finally, we could stipulate that D = 0 iff D does not fire at all, and D = 1 iff it 
fires feebly (alternatively: iff it fires normally). Then the foregoing equation for E is 
correct, but no equation for D is possible. Inevitably, then, something is left out: ei-
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ther we can’t properly get E into the picture, or we can’t properly get A into the pic-
ture, or we can’t properly get D into the picture. The fix, obviously, is to let D have 
three distinct values: 0 (doesn’t fire), 1 (fires feebly), 2 (fires normally). Then we get 
perfectly adequate equations: 
E ⇐ (3D – D
2)/2 
D ⇐ C(A + C) 
The final point to emphasize is this: It would be a total disaster if we built a model 
that gave a role to both A and E, not by letting D have three values, but rather by 
stringing together the equation for D taken from the first model with the equation 
for E taken from the second: 
D ⇐ AC 
E ⇐ D 
Now we really have equivocated, for the first equation is only correct if “D = 1” 
means that D fires normally, whereas the second is only correct of “D = 1” means 
that D fires somehow or other. Alas, we’ll see just this mistake being committed, in 
the standard structural equations treatment of late preemption (§5.4). 
We now have reasonably good answers to the two questions raised at the outset: 
What are variables? What are the truth-conditions for structural equations? Certainly, 
our answers are good enough to let us go ahead and use causal models in giving an 
account of causation, without feeling too ashamed of ourselves. Still, it should also 
be clear that no special advantage accrues to using causal models. We now understand what 
structural equations say—and understanding it, we can see that they are nothing more 
than a device for selectively representing aspects of an antecedently understood counter-
factual structure. In any given situation, that structure is fixed by what happens, to-
gether with the fundamental laws, in a way that is articulated in a perfectly detailed 
and adequate manner by the Maudlin-recipe (including the sequential updating vari-
ant). And that fact gives us excellent grounds for concluding that, when it comes to 
producing a rich and illuminating account of causation, anything that can be accom-
plished by means of causal models can be accomplished just as straightforwardly 
without them. We’ll see in §7 that this conclusion is exactly right. 
§5 Trouble cases 
Now we’ll see how little is in fact accomplished by the structural equations ac-
counts that have been put forward. (At least, the two sketched in §2; there won’t be 
any profit in exploring the variants that have appeared in the literature.) We’ll look at 
four more examples.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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§5.1 Switches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
All of the neurons depicted here are normal, except for F. It’s firing has no effect 
on the firing of B; rather, what F does is to determine down which of the two chan-
nels exiting from B the stimulatory signal from B travels. If F fires, as it does in fig-
ure 7, then the stimulatory signal gets sent to C; if it doesn’t, the signal gets sent to 
D: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
Neuron F thus acts as a “switch”. Real-world analogues are easy to come by. For ex-
ample, the following case, and variants, have been much discussed: 
The Engineer: An engineer is standing by a switch in the railroad tracks. A train 
approaches in the distance. She flips the switch, so that the train travels down the 
left-hand track, instead of the right. Since the tracks reconverge up ahead, the train 
arrives at its destination all the same. 
Many people, myself included, share the judgment that such “switching” events 
are  not  causes  of  the  relevant  effects:  F,  in  figure  7,  is  not  a  cause  of  E—
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notwithstanding that it is a cause of C, and C of E.
26 Both the H-account and the 
HP-account say otherwise; it will be enough to look at the H-account to see why. 
Let’s begin with the obvious causal model, which has this directed graph: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directed graph for figures 7 & 8 
 
Here are the equations (I’ll leave it as an exercise to check that they are the correct 
equations, given the results of the last section): 
E ⇐ C + D – CD 
D ⇐ B(1 – F) 
C ⇐ BF 
B ⇐ A 
Finally, the variables have these values: 
A = B = C = F = E = 1 
D = 0 
One path from F to E is F-C-E. Then D is an off-path variable. Furthermore, 
if (F = 0 & D = 0), then E = 0 
is true. So F turns out to be a cause of E. The same result holds in The Engineer: for 
the right-hand track is in fact empty; and if, in the counterfactual situation in which 
she doesn’t flip the switch, it somehow remains so, then the train does not arrive at 
its destination. 
I do not think this result is completely devastating. (After all, I’m on record as pro-
viding not-very-compelling but not-entirely-worthless reasons for thinking that F is a 
cause of E.) But it is a problem. And, there is—as we will shortly see—a natural way 
to develop an account that avoids it. At any rate, there is no clean way around it, on 
the approaches we’re currently considering. Now, Halpern and Pearl think otherwise. 
                                                 
26 In Hall 2000, I labored mightily to have the contrary intuition, in order to preserve the transi-
tivity of causation. I now think that was probably a mistake. 
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They point out, in effect, that we could have described figures 7 and 8 by means of a 
model that collapses the distinct variables C and D into one: 
G: has value 2 if neuron C fires and D does not; has value 1 if D fires and C 
does not; has value 0 if neither D nor C fire. 
This choice yields a modified directed graph: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modified directed graph for figures 7 & 8 
 
And new structural equations: 
E ⇐ (3G – G
2)/2 
G ⇐ B(B + F) 
B ⇐ A 
It’s routine to verify that, relative to this model, both the H-account and the HP-
account deliver the verdict that while A and B are causes of E, F is not. 
Halpern and Pearl commend these contrasting verdicts. Commenting on The 
Engineer, they write: 
Can a change in representation turn a non-cause into a cause? 
It can and it should! The change to a two-variable model [i.e., the model that dis-
tinguishes C from D] is not merely syntactic, but represents a profound change in 
the story. The two-variable model depicts the tracks as two independent mecha-
nisms, thus allowing one track to be set (by action or mishap) to false (or true) 
without affecting the other. Specifically, this permits the disastrous mishap of flip-
ping the switch while the left track is malfunctioning. More formally, it allow a set-
ting where F = 1 and C = 0. Such abnormal settings are imaginable and ex-
pressible in the two-variable model, but not in the one-variable model. Of course, if 
we disallow settings where F = 1 and C = 0, or where F = 0 and D = 0, then 
we are essentially back at the earlier [i.e., one-variable] model. The potential for 
such settings is precisely what renders F a cause of E in the model of figure 7. 
Is flipping the switch a legitimate cause of the train's arrival? Not in ideal situations, 
where all mechanisms work as specified. But this is not what causality (and causal 
modeling) are all about. Causal models earn their value in abnormal circumstances, 
created  by  structural  contingencies,  such  as  the  possibility  of  a  malfunctioning 
track. It is this possibility that should enter our mind whenever we decide to desig-
nate each track as a separate mechanism (i.e., equation) in the model and, keeping 
this contingency in mind, it should not be too odd to name the switch position a 
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cause of the train arrival (or non-arrival). (Halpern & Pearl 2005, p. REF, with mi-
nor relettering) 
I think the discussion here has gone off the rails. (Sorry!) Let’s first focus on this 
sentence, with italics added: “The two-variable model depicts the tracks as two inde-
pendent mechanisms, thus allowing one track to be set (by action or mishap) to false 
(or true) without affecting the other.” The ill-chosen word “allowing” suggests that 
they think that it is only by introducing distinct variables for the two tracks that one 
can, for example, represent “the disastrous mishap of flipping the switch while the 
left track is malfunctioning”. This suggestion is, of course, absurd. The one-variable 
model (i.e., with G in place of C and D) will serve just fine, provided we give G 
more values. For example, nine of them: 
G: has value 0 if the train is sent down neither track; 1 if sent down left track and 
both tracks operational; 2 if sent down right track and both tracks opera-
tional; 3 if sent down left track and left track alone malfunctions; 4 if sent 
down right track and left track alone malfunctions; 5 if sent down left track 
and right track alone malfunctions; 6 if sent down right track and right track 
alone malfunctions; 7 if sent down left track and both tracks malfunction; 8 
if sent down right track and both tracks malfunction. 
Notice, in addition, that the ‘enhanced’ one-variable model that incorporates G does 
not deliver the verdict that the switch-flipping is a cause of the arrival—despite the 
addition of six new values for G. So it was not the choice to recognize certain ‘struc-
tural contingencies’ that altered the verdict about the causal status of the switch-
flipping; rather, it was the choice to represent these contingencies in a certain way—a 
way, moreover, that is purely optional. Presumably, something ought to govern this fur-
ther choice, something, that is, beyond the desire to model the given contingencies. 
But what that something is is left a complete mystery. 
What’s more, there are, quite plainly, other reasons for choosing to introduce dis-
tinct variables besides the desire to represent outlandish contingencies. How about 
this simple one: the distinct variables correspond to distinct physical parts of the to-
tal system in question? In §3, we saw the pressing need for rules that would help to 
constrain the choice of variables, and the rule we came up with—choose distinct 
variables to represent the states of distinct subsystems-at-times—seemed a perfectly 
sensible one, especially when, as in figures 7 and 8, it is perfectly obvious how to ap-
ply it unambiguously. We should expect some reason to think that this rule will lead us 
astray, and Halpern & Pearl offer none. 
Consider, finally, the remarkable claim that the quoted passage ends with: “keep-
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cause of the train arrival”. Well, let’s test this claim. Re-read The Engineer. Focus on 
the following possibility: there could have been a flaw in the right-hand track, one that 
would have prevented the train from reaching its destination, had the engineer failed 
to flip the switch. Could have been—but isn’t. Has it now become, in your mind, 
“not too odd to name the switch position a cause of the train arrival”? A possible 
response: “The possibility of such a flaw is not merely unrealized, but remote. So re-
mote, that it is inappropriate to model the situation in such a way that recognizes this 
possibility. But the two-variable model does recognize this possibility. It is, in effect, 
the inappropriateness of its doing so that our causal judgments are tracking, when 
they stubbornly refuse to countenance the switch position as a cause of the arrival.” 
(Hitchcock 2001 develops a similar line of argument.) 
This response improves upon what Halpern and Pearl say: instead of giving a 
bad explanation of why we might introduce distinct variables for the distinct tracks, 
it gives a somewhat better explanation of why we ought not to: doing so allows the 
model  to  represent  possibilities  that  are  too  outlandish.  (Never  mind  that  other 
choices—e.g., the choice to give G many more possible values—would also do so.) 
Unfortunately, it throws out the baby with the bathwater. Recall figure 2, our simple 
case of early preemption. There, what allowed the H- and HP-accounts to get the 
right result was precisely that the natural causal model can represent a certain outland-
ish possibility: namely, a possibility in which, even though A fires and C does not, B 
fails to fire. So we haven’t really made any progress. 
What’s more, this last observation about figure 2 points to a much deeper prob-
lem. The next two examples will put it vividly on display. 
§5.2 Non-existent threats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 
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Figure 9 depicts a process—the one running from A to E—that is under a threat: 
for if the process initiated by B is not somehow blocked, it will end up preventing E. 
Fortunately, C fires, thus preventing the crucial intermediate neuron D from firing. E 
thus counterfactually depends on C, not because C is causally connected to it in a 
‘normal’ way, but rather because C is linked to it via a two-step ‘double-prevention’ 
chain. 
Let’s agree, for the sake of simplifying the rest of the discussion, that C is a cause 
of  E.
27  Certainly,  the  H-account,  HP-account,  and  indeed  every  other  structural 
equations account with which I am familiar will say so, since all of them take it that 
counterfactual dependence suffices for causation. The trouble lies elsewhere, with 
figure 10: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
 
In figure 9, C earned the right to be counted a cause of E solely because it cancelled a 
threat to E, a threat initiated by B. In figure 10, there is no such threat. It would 
therefore be absurd to count C a cause of E. If you’re unsure—perhaps because an 
excess  of  neuron  diagrams  has  triggered  intuition  fatigue—then  consider  simple, 
real-world analogs. The family sleeps peacefully through the night, in part because 
the watchful police have nabbed the thief before he can enter the house. Causation, 
clearly. But: the family sleeps through the night, in part because the watchful police 
have done nothing, there being no thieves anywhere in the vicinity? That is plainly 
silly, and constitutes nothing more than a conflation of causing with safeguarding. 
                                                 
27 Thus I am distancing myself somewhat from the view expressed in Hall (2004c), though largely 
to avoid needless complication. There, I distinguished “production” from “dependence”; what I will 
sketch in §7 is a kind of generalization of dependence, attractive in part because it provides a natural 
way to categorize certain cases of ‘double prevention with backup’ about which the earlier, two-fold 
distinction fell silent. 
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 It is a signal failure of the HP-account (although not, interestingly, of the H-
account) that it makes just this conflation. Construct the obvious causal model of 
figure 10, the one with these equations: 
E ⇐ A(1 – D) 
D ⇐ B(1 – C) 
We have the actual values  
A = C = E = 1 
B = D = 0 
C-D-E is a path from C to E, B an off-path variable. Focusing on the non-actual 
value B = 1, we have the true conditional 
if (C = 0 & B = 1), then E = 0 
What’s more, the additional restrictive condition in the HP-account is met, as witness 
the true conditional 
if (C = 1 & B = 1), then (C = 1 & D = 0 & E = 1) 
So the model counts C as a cause of E—even when the threat C guards against is 
non-existent! 
Notice that the arguments, such as they were, that could be called on to try to 
block the unwelcome result about switches are not available here. It’s not that we can’t 
find some correct causal model for the situation, according to which C does not cause 
E. We can always do that, provided that (as here) E does not counterfactually depend 
on C.
28 Here, for example, we could simply omit the variable B from our model. But 
Halpern and Pearl’s insistence that “causal models earn their value in abnormal cir-
cumstances, created by structural contingencies” should, if taken seriously, force us 
to include it. What’s more, what principled basis could there be for omitting B in this 
case, but including A and B in the model for figure 2 (essential, if the model is to 
count C a cause of E)? That this is what we must do, in order to get the intuitively 
correct result? Reading Halpern and Pearl, one often gets the queasy feeling that that 
is the answer working behind the scenes. 
There is one more point worth emphasizing, which should quell any temptation 
to  view  the  unwelcome  result  about  figure  10  as  simply  displaying  the  “model-
relativity” of causation. Such model-relativity might make sense if what we are doing 
is choosing between different ways of representing a given aspect of some situation. 
(Cases of switching strike some as a good example; see §7 for a better one.) But it 
doesn’t make sense if, instead, what we are doing in moving from one model to an-
other is simply increasing the number of aspects we are choosing to represent. Halpern 
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and Pearl, in other words, need to claim that, in modeling figure 10 without the vari-
able B, we are modeling the situation appropriately (so: good news that this model de-
livers the intuitively right result that C is not a cause of E). But, they must further 
claim, when we simply represent additional neurons, we are modeling the situation inap-
propriately, and so get the wrong result. Good luck to them. 
There is a lesson here about methodology. In giving an account of some phi-
losophically interesting concept, it may be valuable to introduce a parameter that can 
shift with context—so that proper application of the concept is revealed to depend, 
in illuminating ways, on more than one might initially have suspected. When does S 
know that P? More carefully, under what conditions is it correct to characterize S’s 
belief that P as knowledge? Perhaps, as recent work on contextualism about knowl-
edge suggests, the correctness of such an attribution depends not only on whether 
S’s belief is true, her evidence for it, and how it was generated, but also on the epis-
temic standards salient in the context in which the question of S’s knowledge arises. 
Similarly, the truth of the claim that C is a cause of E may depend, in part, on a con-
textually salient way of conceptualizing the details of the situation in which C and E 
occur. Causal models might provide one way of making this talk of “ways of concep-
tualizing” precise. 
Yes, this possibility is worth exploring. But one’s research program degenerates if 
one exploits it in a cavalier manner, invoking talk of “model relativity” to block any 
counterexample.  Some  rules  must  govern  such  talk,  and  structural  equations  ap-
proaches have so far done a poor job of providing them.  
§5.3 Short-circuits 
The H-account, at least, does not fall into the trap set by figure 10. But it (hence 
the HP-account as well) does fall into a closely related trap: 
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C initiates a threat to E: for if nothing stops D from stimulating F, then E won’t fire. 
C also cancels this threat, by way of B. So the little four-neuron network C-D-B-F 
might aptly be called a “short-circuit”, with respect to E.  
I think, and most agree, that C is not a cause of E.
29 As is well known, that judg-
ment spells trouble for the combined claims that causation is transitive, and that 
counterfactual dependence suffices for causation: for E depends on B, which in turn 
depends on C. Now, both of our structural equations accounts eschew transitivity. 
But that probably sensible move is of no help here, as each unavoidably counts C in 
figure 11 a cause of E for a different reason. For, holding fixed the fact that D fires, if C 
hadn’t fired, then E wouldn’t have.  
Let’s double-check this result, by constructing the obvious causal model. We 
have the usual binary variables A, B, C, D, E, and F, together with these structural 
equations: 
E ⇐ A(1 – F) 
F ⇐ D(1 – B) 
D ⇐ C 
B ⇐ C 
The actual values are these: 
A = B = C = D = E = 1 
F = 0 
Consider the conditional 
if (C = 0 & D = 1), then E = 0 
We ignore the third equation. Having set C to 0 and D to 1, we update B to 0 by the 
fourth equation. We then update F to 1 by the second equation, and thus E to 0 by 
the first. So the conditional is true. So both the H-account and HP-account classify C 
as a cause of E. What’s more, they do so for exactly the same reason that they count C, 
in figure 2, a cause of E—whence we now have good reason to doubt that they got 
that case right for the right reasons. 
That’s a bad outcome. I trust that it is, by now, sufficiently obvious that no 
amount of whining about ‘model-relativity’ will make it look any better.  
§5.4 Late preemption 
It would seem, judging from their treatments of switching, non-existent threats, 
and short-circuits, that structural equations account are not to be trusted as provid-
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ing a sufficient condition for causation. Time now to look at the most famous chal-
lenge to the necessity of counterfactual analyses, which is late preemption. I will rely 
on the classic example: 
Suzy First: Suzy, an expert rock-thrower with a taste for minor acts of destruc-
tion, throws a rock at a bottle. The rock hits the bottle, shattering it. Suzy’s friend 
Billy throws a rock at the bottle, too. He’s just as expert as she is, but a bit slower. 
Consequently, her rock gets there first; but if she hadn’t thrown it, the bottle would 
have shattered all the same, thanks to his throw. 
It is supposed to be a major achievement of structural equations approaches that 
they offer a powerful new technique for dealing with such a stubborn counterexam-
ple to so many counterfactual analyses. In fact, they fail rather miserably, and at a 
surprising stage: the causal models standardly offered as representations of cases like 
Suzy First are simply incorrect. I’ll consider one example, taken from Halpern & Pearl 
(2005).  
Superficially, the model is quite elegant and simple; judging from various conver-
sations I’ve had, it is currently thought of as providing the canonical structural equa-
tions treatment of Suzy First. It makes use of just five variables: 
ST: has value 0 if Suzy does not throw; 1 if she does. 
BT: has value 0 if Billy does not throw; 1 if she does. 
SH: has value 0 if Suzy’s rock does not hit the bottle; 1 if it does. 
BH: has value 0 if Billy’s rock does not hit the bottle; 1 if it does. 
BS: has value 0 if the bottle does not shatter; 1 if it does. 
We should understand each of these variables as making implicit reference to a par-
ticular time. More specifically, let’s stipulate that Suzy throws at time 0, Billy throws 
at (slightly later) time 1, Suzy’s rock strikes the bottle at time 2, Billy’s rock would have 
struck the bottle at time 3 (i.e., if Suzy’s had not already done so), and the bottle is in 
a shattered state at time 4. So ST characterizes what Suzy is doing at time 0; BT 
what Billy is doing at time 1; SH what Suzy’s rock is doing at time 2; BH what 
Billy’s rock is doing at time 3; and BS the state of the bottle at time 4. What we wish 
to write down are structural equations that show that it is Suzy’s throw, and not 
Billy’s, that causes the bottle to be in a shattered state at time 4. 
This seems to be easy to do. Halpern and Pearl—and just about everyone else, as 
far as I can tell—find the following equations satisfactory: 
BS ⇐ BH + SH – BH•SH 
BH ⇐ BT(1 – SH) 
SH ⇐ ST   Structural Equations and Causation   
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Assuming these equations are correct, it’s not too hard to confirm that both the H-
account and the HP-account judge Suzy’s throw to be a cause of the shattered state, 
by virtue of the conditional 
if (ST = 0 & BH = 0), then BS = 0 
It’s also not too hard to confirm that neither account will judge Billy’s throw to be a 
cause of the shattered state (I’ll leave it as an exercise). 
Success? Not so fast. Let’s take a close look at what these equations mean. The 
third is unobjectionable: it says that Suzy’s rock will hit the bottle iff she throws it. 
Given that we only mean to be considering four options for the temporally prior 
variables BT and ST—she throws/doesn’t throw at just the time and with just the 
speed she does; he throws/doesn’t throw at just the time and with just the speed he 
does—this equation is perfectly correct. The first equation might also seem correct: 
for it says merely that the bottle will be in a shattered state iff at least one of the 
rocks hits it. Likewise the second, which says that Billy’s rock will hit the bottle iff he 
throws it, and Suzy’s rock hasn’t already hit it (for in that case, it won’t be there for 
his rock to hit). 
But now we should smell a rat. Look again, and closely, at the first two equa-
tions. The first strikes us as true in part because, when we envision a situation in 
which BH = 0 and SH = 0, we understand that BH = 0 because Billy’s rock isn’t 
thrown, and instead lies idle (we may suppose) in his hand. But the second strikes us 
as true in part because, when we envision a situation in which BT = 1 and SH = 
1, we understand that BH = 0 because the bottle isn’t there to be hit. The model is simply 
trading on this ambiguity in the content of the claim “BH = 0”. Remove the ambi-
guity, and one or the other of the first two equations must be revised. 
Let’s work through this again, slowly and systematically, making explicit use of 
the  truth-conditions  for  structural  equations  spelled  out  in  §4.  Those  truth-
conditions will straightforwardly vindicate the third equation. As for the second, we 
begin by observing that the variables that are candidates for figuring in the equation 
for BH are ST, BT, and SH, since these are the only variables temporally prior to 
BH. There are eight settings for these three variables to consider. Following the se-
quential updating version of the Maudlin-recipe, we can immediately see that in any 
counterfactual situation in which ST = 1 and SH = 1, the bottle must be in a 
shattered state immediately after time 2 (so: before time 3). Forward evolution in ac-
cordance with the laws will give us a time-3 state of the world in which the bottle is 
still shattered; hence BH = 0, regardless of the value of BT—provided we under-
stand  “BH  =  0”  as  meaning  simply  that  Billy’s  rock  fails  to  strike  the  bottle.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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(Shortly, we’ll see reasons to understand it differently.) That takes care of two of the 
eight cases. Suppose next that ST = 0 and SH = 0. Then, clearly, BH = 1 iff 
BT = 1. That takes care of two more cases. There are two more cases in which BT 
= 0, in both of which ST ≠ SH; it’s not clear what goes on with Suzy’s rock in 
those cases, but at any rate we can be sure that BH = 0, since Billy’s rock isn’t even 
thrown. Now to the two remaining cases: 
BT = 1, ST = 1, SH = 0. Here, the time-0 state of the world is just the ac-
tual state, and no local modifications are necessary until we reach time 2, at which 
point we need to adjust the state so that SH = 0. Now, just how exactly do we do 
this? If the claim “SH = 1” is supposed to mean that Suzy’s rock strikes the bottle 
in a certain way—namely, the way in which it actually strikes the bottle—and if “SH 
= 0” is supposed to be true iff “SH = 1” is false, then the problem is that there are 
far too many ways to locally modify the state so that SH = 0, and no principled 
way to choose among them. Worse: some of these modifications will yield forward 
evolutions in which the bottle is shattered, in which case we won’t get the result that 
Halpern and Pearl apparently think is so obvious: namely, that for this choice of val-
ues, the correct equation must yield BH = 1. For example, Suzy’s rock might strike 
the bottle in a rather different way from how it actually does, but still hard enough to 
break it. 
Well, can’t we just read “SH = 0” as saying that Suzy’s rock doesn’t strike the bottle? 
If so, it obviously doesn’t strike it in a different way! But that isn’t really any help, for 
we are still left with the mystery as to how to locally modify the state of the world, so 
as to secure the truth of this claim. More to the point, one way to effect this modifica-
tion is to have the bottle be in a shattered state before Suzy’s rock can strike it, whence 
forward evolution will give us the unwanted BH = 0, as before. How, exactly, are 
we supposed to rule out such a modification as illegitimate? 
As far as I can tell, the only clean, non-ad-hoc way to secure the desired result is 
to read “SH = 0” as meaning that Suzy’s rock is simply absent (absent, that is, from 
the neighborhood of the bottle—perhaps we should return it to Suzy’s hand…), at 
the relevant time. Let us so read it. Then granted: BH = 1. 
BT = 1, ST = 0, SH = 1. Here, the time-0 state of the world is one in which 
Suzy is not throwing, but, as in the actual world, Billy is preparing to throw. Forward 
evolve this state until time 1. Billy throws (so no local modifications to the state are 
necessary). Forward evolve the resulting state until time 2. Make local modifications, 
so that Suzy’s rock—which, remember, has been sitting in her hand—hits the bottle. 
Once again it’s not so clear how to proceed, since we haven’t said with enough speci-  Structural Equations and Causation   
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ficity what the content of the claim “SH = 1” is. So let’s correct that oversight, by 
stipulating that this claim says that Suzy’s rock hits the bottle in just the way it does 
in the actual situation.
30 Now we can proceed: the bottle breaks. Forward evolving, 
we see that Billy’s rock doesn’t strike the bottle. But it doesn’t follow that BH = 
0—that depends, unsurprisingly, on what the precise content of this claim is. If we 
take our cue from the foregoing discussion of “SH = 0”, we will say that “BH = 
0” is false in this situation, since Billy’s rock is not absent from the given region: it’s 
there all right, it’s just flying over scattered shards of bottle-glass. But presumably 
this is not what Halpern and Pearl have in mind. So let’s take it that “BH = 0” 
means simply that Billy’s rock doesn’t strike the bottle. Then granted: BH = 0. 
We’ve now secured the second of the three structural equations, albeit at some 
cost: we were forced, somewhat surprisingly, to treat “BH = 0” as not at all analo-
gous to “SH = 0”. As you may have guessed, there is worse trouble ahead. We run 
into it as soon as we try to write down an equation for BS. 
Consider the values BT = 1, ST = 0, SH = 0, BH = 0. What should be the 
corresponding value for BS? It should be BS = 0, we are told—after all, we are 
describing  a  situation  in  which  neither  rock  strikes  the  bottle.  But  having  been 
alerted by the foregoing discussion, we can easily see how this response involves 
some sleight-of-hand. Let’s work through the case systematically, to pin down where 
the fallacy is lurking. 
For the given values of the ‘input’ variables, we start with a time-0 state locally 
modified from the actual state, so that Suzy does not throw. Evolve forward to time 
1. Billy throws (no modification necessary). Evolve forward to time 2. Suzy’s rock is 
absent from the region of the bottle (no modification necessary). Evolve forward to 
time 3. Billy’s rock is about to strike the bottle—and now we need to make local ad-
justments, so that it doesn’t. Not not NOT so that his rock is absent: we know how to 
do that (just change the world-state to that no rock is there, replacing it by air), and 
we know that forward evolution of such a modified state will yield a time-4 state in 
which the bottle is not shattered. But all this is entirely irrelevant, since we already 
know, from having thought through the equation for BH, that “BH = 0” had bet-
ter not mean that Billy’s rock is absent from the region of the bottle (else that equa-
tion is simply incorrect); rather, it had better mean that Billy’s rock—one way or an-
other—does not strike the bottle. And with that meaning, the instructions to locally 
                                                 
30 To clarify: There is a certain way that Suzy’s rock hits the bottle in the actual situation, charac-
terized by a certain velocity, approach vector, etc. “SH = 1” says that Suzy’s rock hits the bottle in 
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modify the state of the world so that BH = 0 are simply too ambiguous: one way is 
to remove Billy’s rock, but another way is to change the state of the bottle from whole 
to shattered. These different modifications yield different forward evolutions—and 
different values for BS. So we cannot, after all, even write down a correct equation for 
BS. 
What is the root of the problem? Hint: you’ve seen such a problem before, in the 
faulty models of figures 5 and 6 discussed toward the end of §4. Let’s take our cue 
from that discussion, and fix things up. 
The key is to recognize that at time 3, there are three distinct states of affairs that 
we will want the variable BH to represent. BH should have one value if Billy’s rock 
is simply absent from the region of the bottle (which is what will happen, if Billy 
doesn’t throw). It should have another value if Billy’s rock is  striking the bottle 
(which is what will happen, if Billy throws but Suzy doesn’t). And it should have a 
third value if Billy’s rock is flying over scattered shards of bottle-glass (which is what 
will happen, if Billy and Suzy both throw). Let these values be 0, 1, and 2, respec-
tively. As for SH, we will keep it two-valued: SH = 0 if Suzy’s rock is absent from 
the region of the bottle; SH = 1 if it strikes the bottle. Now we can apply the Maud-
lin-recipe cleanly; for we no longer are trying to make the single value BH = 0 do 
double duty, signifying that Billy’s rock is absent, when used in the equation for BS, 
but that Billy’s rock doesn’t strike the bottle, when derived using the equation for 
BH. The following equations result: 
BS ⇐ sign(SH + BH) 
BH ⇐ (SH + BT)BT 
SH ⇐ ST 
Now that we have a causal model that we need not feel ashamed of, do we at last 
get the right result—that Suzy’s throw, and not Billy’s, is a cause of the bottle’s shat-
tered state? That depends. Deploy the H-account, and you don’t. Deploy the more 
permissive HP-account, and you do. Let’s look at the details. 
The only relevant path from ST to BS is ST-SH-BS. The off-path variables 
have values BT = 1 and BH = 2. Either of two conditionals could thus testify to 
ST’s causal status with respect to BS. But both of them are false: 
if (ST = 0 & BT = 1), then BS = 0 
if (ST = 0 & BH = 2), then BS = 0 
Suppose we had reported the actual value of BH this way: BH ≠ 1. Then we might 
think to confirm the causal standing of ST by means of the following conditional:   Structural Equations and Causation   
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if (ST = 0 & BH ≠ 1), then BS = 0 
This conditional can seem to be true, if what we have in mind as a situation in which 
BH ≠ 1 is a situation in which the bottle remains intact, but Billy’s rock somehow 
never reaches it. But, as soon as we take care to distinguish this situation from the 
situation in which Billy’s rock does not strike the bottle because the bottle is already shat-
tered, we expose this reasoning as fallacious. In fact, the correct causal model simply 
fails to assign a truth-value to this conditional. And that is because the antecedent is 
ambiguous. Disambiguated one way, we get the relevant but false conditional 
if (ST = 0 & BH = 2), then BS = 0 
Disambiguated the other way, we get the true but irrelevant conditional 
if (ST = 0 & BH = 0), then BS = 0 
Thus, we have made exactly zero progress on the problem of late preemption, at 
least within the confines of the H-account. 
Intriguingly, the HP-account fares better, precisely because it allows us to find 
“witnessing” conditionals in which the off-path variables have non-actual values. 
This one will do: 
if (ST = 0 & BT = 0), then BS = 0 
The corrected equations count this conditional as true. What’s more, this choice of 
value for BT meets the additional restrictive condition: 
if (ST = 1 & BT = 0), then (ST = 1 & SH = 1 & BS = 1) 
So far, so good: Suzy’s throw gets to cause the bottle to be shattered. How about 
Billy’s throw? The only path is BT-BH-BS, with values 1-2-1. The only relevant 
way to set the values of off-path variables is this: 
if (BT = 0 & SH = 0), then BS = 0. 
But the second condition fails, since 
if (BT = 1 & SH = 0), then (BT = 1 & BH = 2 & BS = 1) 
is false. Success: the HP-account—when it uses the right causal model!—gets Suzy 
First right. But given the extreme permissiveness of the account, this success is no 
real cause for celebration: remember that it is exactly the flexibility to allow off-path 
variables to take on non-actual values that forces this account (unlike the H-account) 
to count as causes things that guard against non-existent threats. We’ll see in §7 how 
to fix this problem, once we expose what is, I think, the deepest mistake committed 
by these structural equations accounts: their failure to incorporate any distinction 
between the default behavior for some bit of the world, and deviations from that 
behavior. That exposé comes next.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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§6 The default/deviant distinction 
 
Let us examine two different cases. They should strike you as having markedly 
different causal structures. The first is a minor variant on the ‘short-circuit’ of §5.3:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 
 
G does not fire. If it had, then E would have depended on C—for C would have 
cancelled not only the threat that it itself initiates, but an independent threat as well. In 
such a case, we might well count C a cause of E. But in the present case, that is a 
mistake. G’s actual behavior poses no threat to E, so while C certainly safeguards E 
against the possible threat of G’s firing, we should not conclude that C is among E’s 
causes. 
Maybe you don’t agree. Never mind. All that really matters, for present purposes, 
is that we see clearly that, whatever causal structure we might wish to impute to the 
events in figure 12, it should be a different causal structure from that exhibited by the 
next case. To help your intuitions along, we will build up to that case in stages: 
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Neuron E in figure 13 is stubborn, needing two stimulatory signals in order to fire. It 
gets them: one from A, one from C. So far, the causal structure is quite clear: A and 
C are both causes—joint causes—of E. Now we will add a slight wrinkle: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 
 
Look at the little network G-D-C-B-F. You’ve seen it before, in figure 2: it’s a simple 
example of early preemption. We know how to think about those cases: C is a cause 
of F, whereas G is a preempted backup. So figure 14, although more complicated 
than figure 13, isn’t at all hard to understand: C is a cause of F, and therefore, with 
A, a joint cause of E; G is not a cause of F, although it would have been, had C not 
fired. There is absolutely no mystery here. 
Now I want you to compare figures 12 and 14. I do not ask that you agree with 
me about their causal characteristics; in particular, you might find figure 12 too con-
fusing. (I rather doubt it. But in my experience, some philosophers who really ought 
to know better claim to be unclear about the causal structure of figure 12.) I do ask 
that you agree that their causal structures are different. For myself, one difference 
could not be more obvious: C in figure 12 is not a cause of E; C in figure 14 is a 
cause of E. But again, it’s enough that you recognize that some difference exists. Or, 
even more cautiously: that a good account of causation ought to treat these two 
cases differently. 
Why am I harping on what, I hope, strikes you as so obvious a point? Perhaps 
you’ve already spotted the reason, but anyway here it is: any structural equations ap-
proach—any whatsoever—that holds that the causal structure of a situation is fixed by 
the correct causal model or models for it, together with the actual values instantiated 
in it, must treat these cases as exactly alike. And that is because their causal models are 
perfectly isomorphic. Maybe that’s obvious; at any rate, let’s confirm it. 
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For figure 12, our model will include the obvious seven binary variables. Here 
are their equations: 
E ⇐ A(1 – F) 
F ⇐ D(1 – B) 
D ⇐ G + C – GC 
B ⇐ C 
The model for figure 14 will likewise include seven binary variables, this time with 
these equations: 
E ⇐ AF 
F ⇐ D + B – DB 
D ⇐ G(1 – C) 
B ⇐ C 
These models look different, of course. But the differences are superficial; the mod-
els are in fact the same. Remember that the numbers we use as values for our vari-
ables are completely arbitrary. For example, in modeling figure 12 we could decide that 
each binary variable has value 5 if the corresponding neuron fires (at the relevant 
time), and value 18 if it doesn’t. The exact form of our equations will reflect these 
choices; for example, with the values 5 for firing and 18 for not, the first equation 
would need to be rewritten: 
E ⇐ 18 – (18 – A)(F – 5)/13 
We could achieve exactly the same effect by introducing different variables, defined 
in terms of the original ones. (E.g., let E* =df 18 – 13E.)  
Accordingly, let’s rewrite the equations in the model for figure 14, using new 
variables in place of D, F, and G: 
D* =df 1 – D 
F* =df 1 – F 
G* =df 1 – G 
Then—making the substitutions just on the left-hand sides—the four equations be-
come 
E ⇐ AF 
F* ⇐ 1 – D – B + DB 
D* ⇐ 1 – G(1 – C) 
B ⇐ C 
Substituting the new variables in on the right-hand sides, these become 
E ⇐ A(1 – F*)   Structural Equations and Causation   
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F* ⇐ D*(1 – B) 
D* ⇐ G* + C – G*C 
B ⇐ C 
That the two models are in fact the same is now obvious. Finally, observe that in fig-
ure 12, the actual values are these: 
A = B = C = D = E = 1 
F = G = 0 
In figure 14, the actual values are these: 
A = B = C = D* = E = 1 
F* = G* = 0 
Suppose an account of causation tries to render a verdict about what causes what, in 
figure 12, making use just of the structural equations for figure 12, plus the actual 
values of the variables. Suppose that account tries to do the same, for figure 14. 
Then  the  isomorphism  between  the  models  establishes—conclusively—that  the  ac-
count will call C in figure 12 a cause of E iff it likewise calls C in figure 14 a cause of 
E. More generally, it will inevitably be forced to say that the two causal structures are 
the same. But they aren’t. So something has gone badly wrong. 
It should be clear what it is. The broad class of accounts we are considering (of 
which the H- and HP-accounts are both instances) make no provision for the possi-
bility that what causes what might be a function, not merely of the abstract patterns 
of counterfactual dependence that the various states of bits of the world enter into, 
but also of the intrinsic nature of those states themselves. In figure 12, the state neuron F is 
in, at the relevant time, is a non-firing state; in figure 14, the corresponding state of 
F—the state that occupies the same location within the abstract structure of counter-
factual dependencies—is a firing state. It must be this difference (and the correspond-
ing difference in the states of D and G) that matters. 
Well, what is this difference? That is, what sort of general characterization ought 
we to give of it? This one, I suggest: it is the difference between a default state of a 
system and a deviation therefrom. Neurons can be in various different states: they can 
be dormant; they can fire this way; they can fire that way; and so on. There is a natu-
ral distinction to draw between these states: dormant on one side, all the rest on the 
other. Likewise, bottles can be in various states: they can lie there placidly, or shatter, 
or melt, and so on. Again, there is a natural distinction to draw: lying there placidly 
on one side, shattering et. al. on the other. And so it goes: we very often find, in con-
templating various parts of the world, that we have a reasonably clear and firm con-
ception of what that part would be doing if nothing was happening to it. That is its 
default state; anything else counts as a deviation.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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That test—a system’s default behavior at a time is the behavior it would exhibit, 
were nothing acting on it—is explicitly causal, thanks to the word “acting”. At this 
point, I do not know whether we can provide a fully general test that isn’t causal, tac-
itly or explicitly. In certain kinds of cases we can provide a test: for sometimes we can 
pick out, in a sufficiently precise and non-arbitrary manner, a state of the system’s 
environment that qualifies as a state in which nothing is happening—a fortiori, a state in 
which nothing is acting on the system. Example (borrowed from Maudlin’s discussion 
in his 2004): A Newtonian particle will exhibit a certain distinguished behavior—
constant, linear motion—in an environment in which nothing else exists. (That’s a 
fancy way of saying: in a world with just that particle in it, it will move with constant 
velocity.) Obviously, if nothing else exists, then there is nothing else that can be the 
subject of a “happening”. So we have our test environment, non-causally character-
ized, and can use it to define default behavior for a Newtonian particle: it is just con-
stant linear motion. Maudlin makes a persuasive case that Newton’s First Law—
which, from a mathematical standpoint, is perfectly redundant, being a trivial conse-
quence of the Second Law—in fact plays an important expository role, precisely be-
cause it explicitly articulates the default behavior for a Newtonian object. 
Alas, I think it is simply not to be hoped that, for every case in which there is 
clear agreement about the default/deviant distinction, the default behavior can be 
analyzed as the behavior the system in question would exhibit, if it were in an envi-
ronment  in  which  nothing  else  was  happening.  Consider  people,  whose  default 
physiological behavior is to go on living. That seems right, at least as one legitimate 
way to draw the default/deviant distinction in this case. (Complications will appear 
shortly, but don’t matter for the present point.) But living is precisely not what they 
would continue to do, if they were in an environment devoid of happenings (let 
alone in an environment in which nothing else existed!).  
Perhaps another test will work: the default behavior for a system, at a time, is the 
behavior it would exhibit if it did not undergo any change, at that time. Any change? 
Then the living person who goes on living is deviating from default behavior. Well, 
maybe no change, outside of certain difficult-to-specify parameters. But even if that 
test worked, it would not cover the case of the Newtonian particle—nor the case of 
any system whose default behavior is periodic (think of a pendulum, as a canonical 
example). 
So a comprehensive, illuminating account of the default/deviant distinction is 
not going to be easy to find. Never mind; we can leave the search for it for another 
day. What I mainly wish to demonstrate, in what follows, is that the distinction pro-
vides the key to a very simple and attractive account of causation. It will be enough 
that we agree, in particular cases, on how to draw the distinction. I will try to help   Structural Equations and Causation   
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foster such agreement with a few observations. They fall regrettably short of any-
thing like a proper theory! 
First, we have already encountered one important role for the default/deviant 
distinction, in evaluating counterfactuals that concern what would have happened, 
had some (actual) event not occurred. A conditional of that form—“if event C had 
not occurred, then…”—has a highly non-specific antecedent. Even if we agree that 
the counterfactual situation described is one in which the rest of the world, apart 
from that bit of it that is involved in C’s occurrence, is in the same state as it actually 
is at the time in question, there are indefinitely many ways to fill in the remaining de-
tails. You walk into a room, and flip a switch, turning on (or off; it doesn’t matter 
which)  the  lights.  What  would  have  happened  if  that  switch-flipping  hadn’t  oc-
curred? More obviously, what would have happened if you hadn’t flipped the switch? 
The question does not direct our attention to a situation whose character, as regards 
the switch’s behavior, is highly indeterminate; we know perfectly well that we mean 
to be talking about a counterfactual state of the world in which the switch’s position 
remains unchanged. Or, as I would put it: a counterfactual situation in which the 
switch is in its default state.  
It is worth noting the contrast between the ease with which we evaluate this 
counterfactual, and the difficulty we find in evaluating counterfactuals of the same 
form, but that concern systems for which the non-arbitrary assignment of a default 
state is impossible. As an artificial but particularly vivid example, consider a cellular 
automaton in which each cell can have, at each moment, one of four different colors: 
red, blue, green, and yellow. A deterministic rule fixes the state of each cell at time 
t+1 as a function of the state of it and its eight neighbors at time t. This rule, fur-
thermore, fails to distinguish any of these states as in any sense a dynamically “inert”, 
or “nothing happening” state.
31 Accordingly, there is no sense in trying to figure out 
what a cell’s state would be, at a given time, if nothing were happening to it: for the 
laws of this little universe guarantee, as it were, that something is always happening to 
every cell. 
Let event C consist in a particular cell A’s being red, at a particular time t. If we 
ask, “What would have happened, had C not occurred?”, we do not construct a single 
counterfactual t-state; rather, we construct three, by holding the state of every other 
                                                 
31 How might the dynamics distinguish one state as a ‘nothing happening’ state? Perhaps this way: 
there might be a unique state such that, if every cell has that state at some time, then given the dynam-
ics, every cell must continue to have that state, thereafter. The idea is that the characteristic dynamical 
behavior of a state of the world that qualifies as a state in which nothing is happening, anywhere, is to 
persist unchanged. Note that in Conway’s game of “Life”, the ‘empty’ cell state has this feature, but 
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cell fixed and letting cell A be green, blue, and yellow, respectively. What would have 
happened is exactly what the cell-dynamics entail, regardless of which of these three 
states we choose. Lacking a default state to ‘return’ cell A to, we exercise the only 
other option: let A counterfactually run through every available state that is compati-
ble  with  our  antecedent.  If  you  need  a  reminder  of  how  pervasive  the  de-
fault/deviant distinction is in our everyday counterfactual reasoning, you need only 
reflect how rare it is to find a real-world analog of this example. 
Second, the default state of a system can change with its circumstances. If a bot-
tle is intact, its default behavior is (among other things) to remain intact; if it is shat-
tered, default behavior is to remain shattered. Similarly with people: if alive, dying 
counts as a deviation; if dead, resurrection likewise counts as a deviation. (Here I’m 
especially indebted to some cogent observations of Chris Hitchcock’s.) Not so with 
our neurons: the default state for a neuron, at any time, is to be dormant. But that 
was a byproduct of optional stipulations. Suppose we modify those stipulations, so 
that neurons are like switches: then, if switched on, their default behavior is to stay 
on; if switched off, to stay off. 
Third, what counts as a default state is not, I think, a purely objective matter. 
(Well, maybe it is in some cases: e.g., for Newtonian particles.) Context can, within 
severe constraints, affect what counts as the appropriate default state for some part 
of the world. Example: A large rock sits in a sealed room, at noon. Arrayed around 
the room are sensitive detectors, which will trigger an alarm if they register a sudden 
pressure change in the room. We ask: what would have happened, at noon, had the 
rock not been present? That is, what would have happened, had there been no rock 
in the region of the room where there is in fact a rock? Two contradictory answers 
are available—each defensible, because each makes tacit use of a different but equally 
legitimate choice of default state, for that region of the room. First answer: nothing 
would have happened; so the presence of the rock makes no difference to whether 
the detectors trigger the alarm. Second answer: without the rock there, a sudden 
drop in pressure would ensue, as air rushed to fill the empty space; so the presence 
of the rock is helping to prevent the detectors from triggering the alarm. You might 
find one answer more persuasive than the other. But I think, in fact, that any attempt 
to rank them is a mistake, which can be brought out by considering this question: 
What is an appropriate default state for the given region of the room? –A state in 
which nothing occupies it, one is tempted to answer. That invites a follow-up: Noth-
ing at all, or just nothing but what would normally occupy it (viz., air)? Choose the 
first answer, and you will judge that without the rock, there would be a sudden drop 
in pressure; choose the second, and you’ll deny this claim. But there is no real con-
flict here—just a difference between equally acceptable ways of filling in the details   Structural Equations and Causation   
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of the counterfactual situation that we specify indeterminately as one in which the 
rock is absent. 
The example reveals not only a context-sensitivity in the default/deviant distinc-
tion, but a way in which that sensitivity can influence causal judgments: whether or 
not we judge the presence of the rock to be preventing the alarm from going off de-
pends on what we take to be the given region’s default state. We’ll see a subtler ex-
ample of the same phenomenon in the next section. To begin, though, we’ll stick to 
easier cases, where the relevant default/deviant distinctions are clear and unambigu-
ous. Writing these distinctions into our account of causation makes it surprisingly 
easy to give a uniform treatment of the sorts of cases that spelled trouble in §5. 
§7 An improved account 
The account I will offer makes use of the following guiding idea: What causes 
what is a matter of the intrinsic character and relations among the events involved. 
As always with guiding ideas, this one can motivate different proposals, differing in 
crucial details. I used to think that the right proposal would need to rest on the 
following thesis, which I viewed as a more precise statement of the guiding idea (Hall 
2004a): 
Intrinsicness: Let S be a structure of events consisting of event E, together with 
all of its causes back to some earlier time t. Let S’ be a structure of events that 
intrinsically matches S in relevant respects, and that exists in a world with the same 
laws. Let E’ be the event in S’ that corresponds to E in S. Let C be some event in S 
distinct from E, and let C’ be the event in S’ that corresponds to C. Then C’ is a 
cause of E’.  
I used to think that Intrinsicness provided the key to one paradigmatic kind of 
causation—what I called “production”—in which the cause brings about its effect by 
way of a connecting process. Production, I thought, should be contrasted with de-
pendence, a more minimal kind of causation in which the only connection between 
cause and effect is that the latter counterfactually depends on the former. I had 
hoped for a simple ‘two concepts’ story, according to which production and depend-
ence typically go hand in hand, but can sometimes come apart: thus, Suzy First 
would be a paradigm example of production without dependence, cases of threat-
canceling dependence without production. Production, finally, struck me as in some 
sense the more important notion, though not so important as to make dependence 
irrelevant to a proper account of causation: 
A third, more congenial objection begins by granting the distinction between pro-
duction and dependence, but denies that dependence deserves to be counted a kind 
of causation at all. Now, I think there is something right about this objection, in that   Structural Equations and Causation   
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production does seem, in some sense, to be the more “central” causal notion. As 
evidence, consider that when presented with a paradigm case of production with-
out dependence—as in, say, the story of Suzy, Billy, and the broken bottle—we 
unhesitatingly  classify  the  producer  as  a  cause;  whereas  when  presented  with  a 
paradigm case of dependence without production … our intuitions (well, those of 
some of us, anyway) about whether a genuine causal relation is manifested are shak-
ier. Fair enough. But I think it goes too far to deny that counterfactual dependence 
between wholly distinct events is not a kind of causal relation. Partly this is because 
dependence plays the appropriate sort of roles in, for example, explanation and de-
cision. (See §8, below, for more discussion of this point.) And partly it is because I 
do not see how to accommodate causation of and by omissions (as we should) as a 
species  of  production;  counterfactual  dependence  seems  the  only  appropriate 
causal relation for such “negative events” to stand in. (Hall 2004c, p. REF) 
That would have been a nice story, one according to which “cause” functions 
like other terms for which we can articulate more than one precise account of their 
application conditions, accounts that typically coincide but occasionally conflict (or 
at least could do so): think of “child”, or “mother”.
32 The analysis of production articu-
lates one set of application conditions; the analysis of dependence another. Or, to put 
the point in a mode that I prefer, production and dependence are two metaphysically 
distinct relations that events (and in the case of dependence, facts) can bear to each 
other, each of which deserves to be called “causal”; the business of the metaphysi-
cian is to explain their structure, and investigate what interesting work they can do. 
We can leave it to the semanticist to explain how, precisely, they connect up to our 
messy term “cause”. 
Much of that picture still strikes me as correct; in particular, I think it is useful 
and important to distinguish production from dependence, and to give a theory of 
each relation. (Production is hard; dependence is comparatively easy, being just, well, 
counterfactual dependence.) But two problems remain. Cases of switching pose the 
first problem: for Intrinsicness, plus one unproblematic assumption, guarantees that 
switches are causes. Recall The Engineer, discussed in §5.1. Imagine a variant, in 
which there simply is no right-hand track. Then the engineer’s action unquestionably 
helps get the train to its destination—i.e., counts as a cause of the arrival. (That is the 
unproblematic assumption.) But the original case contains, we may suppose, a per-
fect duplicate of the events that unfold in this variant. Apply Intrinsicness, and you 
get the unwelcome result that even in the original case, the engineer’s action is a 
cause of the arrival. The generalized result cannot be avoided: an account of produc-
tion that rests on Intrinsicness must call switches producers of the relevant effect, and 
so in one central sense causes.  
                                                 
32 “Child”: we can focus on chronological age, or on physiology. “Mother”: to be a biological 
mother is not the same thing as to be an adoptive mother.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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The second problem arises from variants on threat-cancelling, in which a backup 
threat-canceller is present, but remains idle. Figure 15 illustrates: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 
 
E faces a threat from the firing of B. C cancels this threat. But F (by way of G) 
would have done so, had C not occurred. E does not depend on C; nor is C con-
nected up to E via the sort of process that would make C counts as a producer of 
E.
33 Given my earlier, dual-concept view, C in no sense counts as a cause of E. That 
seems wrong: F notwithstanding, it is C that in fact cancels the threat to E, and can-
celing a threat is one way to be a cause. 
These are not fatal objections, particularly given the methodological stance out-
line in §1: I could say, I suppose, that our ordinary intuitions about cases have guided 
us to two potentially useful concepts, and leave it at that. But I think I can do better. 
There is another, subtly different way to exploit the guiding idea that what causes 
what is a matter of the intrinsic character and relations among the events involved. It 
was suggested to me by Joshua Haas
34; I’ll now try to explain it. 
Imagine a situation where all sorts of things are happening. C occurs. A bit later, 
E occurs. Lots else occurs, besides. E does not depend on C, let’s suppose. Never-
theless, it might be that the right sort of structure is in place to support such depend-
                                                 
33 That’s generally true of threat-cancelers: since the presence of the threat is typically extrinsic to 
any reasonable candidate for a sequence of causes connecting the threat-canceler to the effect, Intrin-
sicness will rule that they are not causes, at least of the sort that thesis aims to characterize. 
34 In a homework exercise for my causation seminar at Harvard, spring 2006. 
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ence, but that events extraneous to this structure are, by their occurrence, masking 
this dependence. We can test for such masking by seeking a variant of this situa-
tion—a nomologically possible variant—in which strictly fewer events occur, and in 
which E does depend on C. (I.e., C and E still both occur; but if C hadn’t, E would 
not have.) If so, then C is a cause of E: for the existence of this variant demonstrates 
that the underlying dependence of E on C is simply being masked. 
By “strictly fewer” I mean this: that every event that occurs in the variant situa-
tion occurs in the actual situation, but not conversely. Without this rider, the test col-
lapses, saying that C is a cause of E if there is some other situation in which E de-
pends on C. That test is far too easy to pass. Our test isn’t. The intuitive idea behind 
it is this: The given situation unfolds in a certain way. It could have unfolded in any 
of a number of different ways. In some of these ways, E depends on C. When it does 
so, that might be because of the presence of novel structure, structure constituted by 
events that do not occur in the actual situation. Alternatively, it might be because of 
the lack of structures that are actually present. It is this last possibility that concerns 
us: it shows, as it were, that C and E are “poised” to exhibit dependence, but for the 
masking effect of some extraneous structure of events. Such “masked dependence” 
suffices for causation. More generally, I propose a necessary and sufficient condition: 
C is a cause of E iff C and E both occur, and there is a nomologically possible situa-
tion in which (i) every event that occurs also occurs in the actual situation; (ii) E de-
pends on C. Special case: this situation simply is the actual situation, whence we get 
the limiting result that counterfactual dependence suffices for causation. 
Shortly, we’ll see the need for further qualifications. But first we need to under-
stand this talk of “situations”, and of “removing” events, in a way that doesn’t re-
place them with any new event. As for “situation”, I think there will be no harm in 
taking a situation to consist of the entire history of the world from the time of C’s 
occurrence to the time of E’s occurrence. In practice, we’ll ignore most of this his-
tory; in particular, our causal models of “situations” will be vastly more selective. 
That’s fine, provided that the verdict about what causes what won’t change, as more 
of the C-E history is explicitly taken into account. That condition, as we will see, sets 
natural limits on how selective our causal models can be. 
As  for  “removing”,  what  we  need  to  appeal  to  is,  not  surprisingly,  the  de-
fault/deviant distinction. In one situation, lots of events occur—that is, various bits 
of the world exhibit deviations from their default states. In another situation, strictly fewer 
events occur—that is, some of the bits of the world that are in deviant states in the 
first situation are in their default states instead; and every other bit is in the same state 
as it was. (Exactly the same state? No. More on this qualification, later.) That is what 
it is for one situation to be, as I will call it, a reduction of another. Letting the “null”   Structural Equations and Causation   
  54 
reduction of a situation just be that situation, we can now say the C causes E iff there 
is some reduction of the C-E situation in which E depends on C. 
Let’s consider how to implement this analysis, within the structural equations 
framework. We will stick with our easy neuron diagrams.
35 The key move is to re-
quire that one of the possible values for each variable be a default value—i.e., a value 
corresponding to a state of affairs in which the system characterized by that variable 
has its default state at the time the variable concerns. We’ve already met this re-
quirement: the conventional value 0, for non-firing, will be the default value for each 
variable. Any other value will be a deviant value. 
Suppose we have a causal model for some situation. The model consists of some 
equations, plus a specification of the actual values of the variables. Those values tell 
us how the situation actually unfolds. But the same system of equations can also rep-
resent nomologically possible variants: just change the values of one or more exogenous 
variables, and update the rest in accordance with the equations. A good model will 
thus be able to represent a range of variations on the actual situation. Some of these 
variations will be—or more accurately, will be modeled as—reductions of the actual 
situation, in that every variable will either have its actual value or its default value. 
Suppose the model has variables for events C and E.  Consider the conditional 
if C = 0, then E = 0 
This conditional may be true; if so, C is a cause of E. Suppose instead that it is false. 
Then C is a cause of E iff there is a reduction of the actual situation according to 
which C and E still occur, and in which this conditional is true. 
Let’s put this idea into practice; along the way, we’ll see why, and in what sense, 
an adequate causal model must be sufficiently comprehensive. Return to figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
  
                                                 
35 What makes them so easy is in part that the default state—namely, non-firing—for a neuron is 
so clear and unambiguous, in part that this choice of default state is fixed, independently of its setting 
or history, and in part that there are so few deviations to keep track of. Remove any of these simplify-
ing conditions, and the account inevitably becomes more complicated. 
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Construct the obvious causal model. According to it, the conditional 
if C = 0, then E = 0 
is false. But there is a reduction in which this conditional is true: namely, the variant 
we arrive at by setting the exogenous variables to the values A = 0, C = 1. So C is 
a cause of E. 
Observve that A is not likewise a cause of E. The conditional 
if A = 0, then E = 0 
is false. The only variant in which it is true is the one in which A = 1 and C = 0. 
But this is not a reduction of the actual situation: for B has the value 1, which is nei-
ther its default value nor its actual value. 
Before turning to harder cases, let’s stop to make an observation about good 
modeling practice. We could, of course, construct a three-variable causal model for 
figure 2, by omitting the variables B and D. Our one equation would then be 
E ⇐ A + C – AC 
According to this model, both A and C are causes of E. No surprise: this model ef-
fectively (mis)treats figure 2 as a case of symmetric overdetermination. Now, we al-
ready knew that this was a bad model for figure 2. But now we can say about more 
about why it is bad. According to the model, the situation in which A = 1 and C = 0 is 
a reduction of the actual situation—since, after all, every variable in the model has either 
its actual or its default value. But this situation is, of course, not a reduction of the 
actual situation. A proper model should have recognized that fact. So a hard and fast 
constraint emerges on models: an adequate model must include enough variables and 
values that it does not represent a variation on the actual situation as being a reduc-
tion, when it is not. 
Let’s cruise now through the problem cases. First, switches: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
Here are the equations: 
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E ⇐ C + D – CD 
D ⇐ B(1 – F) 
C ⇐ BF 
B ⇐ A 
The variables have these actual values: 
A = B = C = F = E = 1 
D = 0 
A and F are the sole exogenous variables. To find a reduction in which E depends 
on F, we must of course let F = 1. Then the only variation we can construct is the 
one in which A = 0 and F = 1. But then E = 0. So the model does not even yield 
a variation in which E depends on F, let alone a reduction in which it does so. So F is 
not a cause of E. Note how effortlessly the approach on offer secures this result: in 
particular, there is absolutely no need to fret about whether the behavior of C and D 
should be collapsed into a single variable.  
Next, non-existent threats. Here we need not even bother reproducing the ex-
ample; a casual glance back at figure 10 will confirm that there is no reduction in 
which E depends on C, and more generally that no event will count as a cause simply 
because it offers safeguards against a non-existent threat. 
Next, short-circuits. As with switches, the verdict comes quickly: there is no vari-
ant in which E depends on C, hence no reduction in which it does so. Again, we 
achieve in a direct and natural way the result that C cannot be a cause of E merely by 
initiating a threat to E that C itself cancels.  
 Next, let us compare figure 12 and 14; we won’t stop to reproduce the causal 
models. Figure 12 has one variant in which E depends on C: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 
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But this variant is not a reduction, since G is in neither its default state nor its actual 
state. Figure 14, by contrast, does have a reduction in which E depends on C: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 
 
The account thus secures—again, rather effortlessly—the obvious contrast between 
the causal structures of figures 12 and 14. 
Next, threat-canceling with backup. Again, the contrast is easy to see. In figure 
18, we have a reduction of the situation depicted in figure 15, and E depends on C: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 
 
However, the closest we can get to a reduction in which E depends on F is this: 
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Figure 19 
 
Not close enough, as is evident. 
Finally, late preemption. Here, we can simply endorse the treatment provided by 
the HP-account, but with an important proviso. The HP-account, when applied to 
the correct causal model for Suzy First, said that Suzy’s throw counts as a cause of the 
bottle’s later shattered state because of the truth of these conditionals: 
if (ST = 0 and BT = 0), then BS = 0 
if (ST = 1 and BT = 0), then (ST = 1 & SH = 1 and BH = 1) 
According to the present account, it is appropriate to focus on these conditionals—
but not for the reasons the HP-account gives. We want two things: First, a reduction 
of the actual situation; the second conditional in effect tells us that that is what we 
get, when we set the values of the two exogenous variables to BT = 0 and ST = 
1. And second, we want the shattered state to depend on Suzy’s throw, in this re-
duced situation; the first conditional describes just such dependence. So the HP-
account arrives at the right answer, but via a mistaken view about what causation 
consists in. 
We can go a bit further. Suppose that C is a cause of E, according to the pro-
posed account. Then there is some causal model of the situation in which C and E 
occur, that has the following features: There are zero of more exogenous variables 
X1, …, Xn, such that the situation in which they all have their default values (i) is 
one in which, given the equations in the model, all variables have either their default 
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or their actual values; (ii) is one in which C and E have their actual values; and (iii) is 
in one that, according to the model, makes the conditional 
if C = 0, then E = 0 
true. Suppose, in addition, that there is at least one path from C to E such that, in 
this reduced situation, every variable on the path has its actual value. (This will typi-
cally if not invariably be the case, it being quite difficult to construct a case in which 
E depends on C, even though every “route” from C to E goes through default 
states!) Letting P describe these values, that means that P is true in the given “re-
duced model”. 
Let the actual value of C be v. Let each variable’s default value be 0. Then, since 
P is true in the reduced model, the conditional 
if (C = v & X1 = 0 & … & Xn = 0), then P 
is true in the model of the actual situation, since the antecedent effectively picks out 
the reduced model. Finally, the conditional 
if (C = 0 & X1 = 0 & … & Xn = 0), then E = 0 
is likewise true in the model of the actual situation. It follows that the HP-account 
will classify C as a cause of E. This result lets us see quite precisely a way in which 
the HP-account was a step in the right direction. It misfires, not because it allows 
off-path variables to have non-actual values, but because it badly mischaracterizes 
the additional constraints that need to be imposed. 
The case of Suzy First brings up an additional issue, one that remains invisible 
when we focus on the highly sanitized neuron diagrams. The reduction of Suzy First 
in which the bottle’s shattered state depends on Suzy’s throw is a situation in which 
Billy doesn’t throw, but rather stands there idle. It counts as a reduction in part be-
cause Suzy, her rock, and the bottle exhibit their actual states, at each time. Put an-
other way, we remove some events, without changing the nature of the remaining 
events. Now, that characterization contains an inaccuracy: for of course the sequence 
of events leading from Suzy’s throw to the bottle’s shattered state will unfold in a 
slightly different manner, in the situation in which Billy doesn’t throw. (The air cur-
rents are a tiny bit different, the gravitational forces on Suzy’s rock are a tiny bit dif-
ferent, etc.) Dealing with fictional neurons, we could stipulate that the events that 
remain unchanged, in a reduced situation, remain strictly unchanged. But the real 
world doesn’t work that way. Rather, what we need to say, somehow, is that a reduc-
tion of a situation is a situation in which some events that actually occur don’t occur 
(being replaced by default states), and in which the remaining events do not differ in 
the way they occur in any but irrelevant respects. That’s a familiar problem, faced, for 
example, by the attempt to treat cases of late preemption by appeal to the Intrinsic-  Structural Equations and Causation   
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ness thesis discussed above. (See Hall 2004a.) I am simply going to leave it as unfin-
ished business to investigate whether the treatment of the problem that works for 
that case can be extended to the “reduction” account being sketched here. 
That completes our tour of the troublesome cases. I’ll consider one more case, 
with a rather different character: far from being a case about which intuitions are 
firm, it is a case about which they can flip-flop in an intriguingly systematic matter
36: 
Unprotected Window: Suzy throws a baseball at a window. Billy leaps up and in-
tercepts it. If he hadn’t, the ball would have struck the window, breaking it. 
Protected Window: As before, except this time the window is protected by a 
high, thick wall, so that if Billy had not intercepted the ball, the ball would have 
bounced harmlessly off the wall. 
Intuitions about Unprotected Window are clear: Billy’s action prevents the win-
dow from being broken. About Protected Window, by contrast, intuition seems to 
equivocate. One argument, borrowed from McDermott (1995), purports to show 
that Billy’s action does prevent the window from breaking: for between Billy and the 
wall, something had to stop the ball, and since the wall didn’t do anything, Billy gets 
the credit. A second argument purports to show that what Billy did was quite incon-
sequential:  for given the presence of the wall, the window was never under any 
threat. Which of these is correct? 
We can make a case that both are correct, if we pay attention to the way the de-
fault/deviant distinction can function in this example. Here is one way: we focus on 
the wall as one of the components of the situation; noting that it remains in its de-
fault state at all times, we observe that there is no reduction of this situation in which 
the intact state of the window depends on Billy’s action.
37 But here is another way: 
instead of focusing on the wall, we focus on the region in which it is located, and we 
assign to that region the default state unoccupied. Then there is a reduction in which the 
window’s intact state depends on Billy’s action. Now, this second choice is hardly the 
most natural choice—which explains, I think, why the McDermott argument has a 
whiff of sophistry about it. But it’s not wholly illegitimate, either. (It’s not as if we’d 
                                                 
36 Maudlin (2004) considers very similar examples; my treatment owes much to his discussion, 
even though it takes a somewhat different approach.  
37 Some care is required here, in handling the notion of “reduction”. Imagine a situation where 
the wall starts out collapsed. Then its default behavior is to remain collapsed. (Compare our earlier dis-
cussion of being alive and being dead, in §6.) Then on one reading, every component has either its 
actual state or its default state: Suzy, the baseball, Billy, and the window all have, at each time, their 
actual states; the wall has, at each time, its default state. That’s not the intended reading. Rather, what 
we need for a reduction is a situation in which every component has, at each time, either its actual 
state, or what in actuality is its default state. Note that this problem doesn’t arise if, as with neurons, a 
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said something off-the-wall like “The default behavior for the wall is to melt, and 
remain melted.”) I suggest that what McDermott’s argument does, for those inclined 
to treat it charitably, is to introduce a context where the contrast between a wall-
present situation and a wall-absent situation becomes salient. 
On the present approach, it should come as no surprise not merely that Pro-
tected Window can evoke such different reactions, but also that varying the details 
can make it easier to draw out one reaction or the other. As the case stands, it seems 
odd, even in the face of McDermott’s argument, to describe it by saying that Billy’s 
action prevents the window from breaking. But suppose we replace the wall by a 
backup catcher—Sally, say—poised to intercept the baseball if Billy doesn’t? Let’s 
stipulate that Sally is perfectly reliable: there is absolutely no question that she will 
intercept the baseball, if Billy doesn’t. Then we can argue as before that the window 
is under no threat, hence Billy does not prevent it from breaking. But that argument 
does not seem quite as persuasive. The counterargument that, between Billy and 
Sally, someone had to stop it—and Sally just stood there idly—seems to have much 
more force. Why is that? 
Here is one explanation. In the actual situation, Sally is alert, poised to intercept 
if Billy doesn’t. We might focus on the contrast between that psychological state, and 
a state she easily could have been in, in which she not only is idle but is disposed to 
remain so, perceived threats to the window notwithstanding. With that as our choice 
of default state for Sally, a reduction is easy to find. Such a choice is reasonably natu-
ral—more natural, at any rate, than shifting attention from the wall to the region it 
occupies, and conceiving of the default state for that region to be unoccupied. 
This completes my sketch of the “reduction” account of causation. It is just a 
sketch: once removed from the safe world of neuron diagrams, it faces a host of 
complications, best pursued on another occasion. For present purposes, I wish to 
emphasize two points. First, while structural equations accounts of causation are 
possible that improve dramatically on the poor offerings found in the literature, there 
is no good reason to think that causation should be analyzed by such means; the in-
flated reputation such approaches currently enjoy is due for a correction. The second 
point is more important: whatever the merits or defects of the “reduction” account, 
the ease with which it provides uniform treatments of cases as diverse as late pre-
emption, switching, and threat-canceling with backup is too striking to be ignored. 
We knew that ordinary counterfactual reasoning employs the default/deviant distinc-
tion (or something like it); what the successes of the “reduction” account suggest is 
that this distinction operates in an even more pervasive manner in our causal reason-
ing. I’ll close with an overview of some of the questions about this distinction that 
strike me as most worth investigating.   Structural Equations and Causation   
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§8 Some larger questions 
First, what makes the distinction tick? In §6, I offered some sketchy remark on 
this topic, but it’s obvious that a proper theory would be welcome. I suggest that in 
pursuing such a theory, a good place to start is with these questions: In how many 
cases can the default behavior of a system be usefully defined as the behavior that 
system would exhibit, in a suitably canonical environment? And when it can, what is 
the proper characterization of this canonical environment? Here it is helpful to re-
member the example of Newtonian particles: the default behavior of such a particle 
is quite naturally picked out in this way, with the obvious choice of “canonical envi-
ronment” being an environment in which that particle is the only thing that exists. 
One topic that bears investigation is the extent to which this example can be general-
ized. 
Second, how does the default/deviant distinction function, in causal reasoning? 
The “reduction” account gives one answer, but it is important to recognize that even 
if that answer succeeds, it is only partial. Consider figures 5 and 6 again: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
Remember that A’s firing only makes a difference to whether D fires normally or 
feebly. Using causal language, we might put the point this way: event A does not 
cause event D, but does cause D to happen one way (as a normal firing) rather than 
A 
C 
D  E 
A 
C 
D  E   Structural Equations and Causation   
  63 
another (as a feeble firing). There are also uses like the following: that C happens one 
way rather than another causes E. And finally: that C happens one way rather than 
another causes E to happen in one way rather than another. Here we see the de-
fault/deviant  distinction  intermixing  with other  contrasts  that  are  more  explicitly 
marked; in the last example, the default/deviant distinction is simply absent. Now, 
uses like these have led some authors (Lewis 1986c, Yablo 1992) to insist that we 
must distinguish, for example, D’s firing from D’s firing normally, in figure 5. These are 
numerically different events, so the story goes; in figure 6, only the former occurs, the lat-
ter being replaced by a new event, D’s firing feebly.  
Although I once found the arguments for such a multiplicity of perfectly coinci-
dent events persuasive, I now think they rest on a confusion about the kinds of 
causal explanations we can give, in answer to why-questions. Focus on some bit of 
the world, at some time. We can ask why that bit has such-and-such a state, at that 
time. Such questions are typically, and perhaps necessarily, contrastive: what we are 
really asking is why that bit has that state, rather than —, where the blank needs to 
be filled in somehow. There are two broadly different ways of filling  it in. First 
choice: fill it in with the default state, for that bit of the world. Second choice: fill it 
in with some other state. I suggest that when we opt for the second choice, we al-
most  always  explicitly  mark  the  intended  contrast,  somehow  (sometimes  with  a 
“rather than” clause, sometimes with stress, etc.). If we do not mark the intended 
contrast by any explicit means, then the presumption is that this contrast is with the 
default state. At any rate, linguistics aside, there is clearly a useful distinction to be 
drawn between why-questions that contrast an actual state with a default state, and 
why-questions that contrast an actual state with an alternative deviation. 
The very same distinction shows up on the end of answers to such why-questions, 
as well. Asked why some bit of the world had that state, rather than such-and-such an 
alternative state, we can reply that this other bit had this state, rather than such-and-
such an alternative.
38 This alternative might be, on the one hand, the default state for 
the given bit of the world, or, on the other hand, some non-actual deviation. We thus 
have a four-fold division: two kinds of questions, two kinds of answers. I think our 
causal talk marks these divisions, in just the way we saw two paragraphs ago. And 
once they are clearly in view, there should be no temptation at all to think that our 
causal talk requires, for its proper understanding, the postulation of a teeming multi-
tude of perfectly coincident events. To think that is to vastly overinflate the ontologi-
cal significance of different ways of asking and answering why-questions. Seeing how 
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the default/deviant distinction can interact with other distinctions helps bring this 
point into focus. 
The third question recalls the methodological remarks in §1. There, I suggested 
that we treat intuitions about cases not as non-negotiable data,  but rather as guides 
to where interesting and useful causal concepts can be found. The “reduction” ac-
count, if it succeeds, certainly articulates an interesting causal concept. But is it use-
ful? For what, exactly? One possible answer: it is useful for the semanticist who 
wishes to provide systematic truth-conditions for English causal locutions. Maybe. 
Still, it would be nice to have another answer, another, more ambitious use to which 
we could put the concept the “reduction” account aims to articulate. There is, cur-
rently at least, something of a puzzle about what this use could be. 
John Campbell has put the point rather nicely
39, in a way that shows that the 
puzzle doesn’t really concern the “reduction” account or indeed any other account, 
but rather our causal intuitions themselves. It is perfectly understandable, Campbell 
notes, that we should conceive of the world in a way that makes that world easier for 
us to navigate: in reasoning about what to do, we need conceptual tools that will help 
us figure out how to manipulate bits of the world, so as to achieve our ends. It might 
be quite useful to know that if we do X, then Y is guaranteed to occur (or at least 
guaranteed to have a high probability of occurring), whereas if we don’t do X then 
we can be sure of no such guarantee. (Maybe other forces are in motion that will 
guarantee Y’s occurrence; still what we care about are the guarantees over future 
states of the world that we can effect.) The relevant notions of control, manipulation, 
guarantee and the like are surely causal, and perfectly good work in metaphysics 
could be done in giving precise articulations of them. But now consider Suzy First, 
again. Suzy’s action guarantees that the bottle will shatter. So does Billy’s. From the 
standpoint of control, manipulation, and guaranteeing future states of the world—
from the standpoint, that is, of the causal notions that we can recognize as having a 
clear reason for being—they seem perfectly on a par. But they are not on a par—not, 
at least, as far as ordinary and quite unshakeable intuition is concerned. Why is that? 
What good does it do us to have such a firm tendency to want to distinguish the rela-
tion between Suzy’s action and the bottle’s shattering as being a profoundly different 
causal relation from that which holds between Billy’s action and the shattering? That, 
I think, is an excellent question; it is the question that lurks behind the search for a 
good use to which to put the “reduction” account, or whatever account improves 
upon it. 
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Fourth, the role of the default/deviant distinction in our causal reasoning raises a 
fascinating question about the extent to which we can expect to be able to draw rich 
causal distinctions within any domain. Work with neuron diagrams, and you can dis-
tinguish, quite easily and clearly, between early preemption, late preemption, switch-
ing, short-circuits, threat-canceling, threat-canceling with backup, symmetric overde-
termination, and no doubt many more varieties of causal structure. I suspect, though 
I do not yet know how to demonstrate, that it is the availability of a crystal clear, per-
fectly sharp default/deviant distinction that enables all of these distinctions to be 
drawn. More specifically, in many cases our conception of the causal structure of a 
situation informs us that the causal relationships between events are secured by the 
way that the processes or mechanisms those events are involved in interact.
40 I strongly 
suspect that this ability to discern a structure of interacting processes rests on a prior 
ability to distinguish default from deviant states of the relevant components.  
Part of the reason is theoretical: the best account of what a “process” is (that I 
know of, anyway) says, roughly, that to distinguish which events constitute a “proc-
ess” initiated by some events C1, …, Cn that occur at time t, we must compare what 
would have happened, had the events C1, …, Cn been the only events to occur at time 
t. (See Hall 2004a, 2004c.) Without a default/deviant distinction ready to hand, we 
can’t make sense of this test. But part of the reason rests on considering certain odd 
examples, such as the multi-colored cellular automaton discussed in §6. That exam-
ple was specifically designed to make it impossible to draw a default/deviant distinc-
tion. Now imagine some portion of the history of such a cellular automaton. Given 
some initial state, we can perfectly predict which states will follow it. We can even 
impose a kind of coarse causal gloss on this evolution: the state of each cell, at a time 
t, will be immediately caused by the states of it and the neighboring 8 cells, at time t-
1; will be slightly less immediately caused by the states of it and the neighboring 24 
cells, at time t-2; etc. But can we discern any finer causal structure than this? Well, yes, 
sometimes: for example, if cell A is red at time t, and would not have been red if 
neighboring cell B had had any other color but blue, at time t-1, then we can specifi-
cally nominate B’s being blue at t-1 as a cause of A’s being red at t. But we have to 
get lucky, as it were, to discern such structure—and I think that structure signifi-
cantly richer than this is going to be impossible to discern. As a test, you might try to 
imagine a combination of rules for this cellular automaton, together with a sequence 
of states, such that it is crystal clear that the state of cell A at time t cancels a threat 
imposed by the state of cell B at t to the state of cell C at much later time t’. I predict 
                                                 
40 Not necessarily in a simple way: e.g., it’s not that we will judge C to be a cause of E iff there is 
a process connecting C to E. Cases of switching show that such a connection does not suffice for 
causation; cases of threat-canceling show that such connection is not necessary for causation.   Structural Equations and Causation   
  66 
that if you succeed, it will only be because you have settled on rules relative to which 
one cell state is a natural choice of default state (e.g., because it is the unique cell 
state such that if every cell has that state, then the rules guarantee that every cell will 
continue to have that state; see fn. 31, and see Maudlin 2004 for related discussion).  
This suspicion, if correct, has relevance for real-world domains, notably the mind. 
People can have, at any given time, a rich set of beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Let us 
grant that the having of such states can be thought of as the occurring of a large 
number of distinct mental events—not, presumably, because they occur in wholly dis-
tinct portions of the brain or soul, but perhaps because the relevant mental states can 
be varied independently of one another. (You could have this belief with this desire, 
or this belief with that other desire, etc.) Let us even grant that we can make good 
sense of counterfactual situations in which most of the mental events that actually 
occur in a given person at a given time are held fixed, while one of them is varied. 
(You have such-and-such beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.; consider what would have 
happened, had just this one belief been different in such-and-such a way….) I actu-
ally think we’ve probably granted way too much by this point, for reasons nicely ar-
ticulated in Campbell (2006). Never mind. What would be crazy to grant—at least, 
without a great deal of supporting work from empirical psychology, none of which, 
to my knowledge, has been carried out—is that for any given mental event, there is a 
clear choice of default state—a clear and determinate conception of what the mind 
would be doing instead, had that event not occurred. Put simply, I suspect that the mind is 
much closer to the cellular automaton than it is to the typical neuron diagram. If so, 
that may make a profound difference to the questions about mental causation for 
which we can reasonably expect answers. Suzy goes to her favorite coffee shop. 
Why? Well, she reckoned she would find Billy there, and wanted to meet up with 
him. That was reason enough. But in addition, she craved espresso, and the coffee 
shop makes it just to her liking. That is also reason enough. “Fine,” we might re-
spond, “but which of these reasons was the causally operative one, on this occasion? 
Did the first preempt the second? Did the second preempt the first? Was this a case 
of symmetric overdetermination?” 
I see no reason to think that these questions make any sense. But if they do, it 
will be in part because, surprisingly, investigation into human psychology reveals that 
there is a natural default/deviant distinction to be drawn. As opposed to pointless 
debates about the phony “exclusion problem”, this seems to me a question about 
mental causation worth pursuing. 
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